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In its 1963 landmark ruling, Brady v. Maryland, the United States Supreme 
Court required prosecutors to disclose to the defense information favorable to 
the defendant about guilt or punishment.1  Sadly, prosecutors all over the country 
                                                 
 + Professor from Practice, Georgetown Law.  Special thanks to Jonathan Anderson, Gillian 
Chadwick, Keith Findley, Eve Hanan, Kathryn Miller, and Tiffany Sizemore.  Many thanks to 
Colleen Cullen for her research help.  
 1. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding “that the suppression by the 
prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the 
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of 
the prosecution.”).  For an analysis on how the Court’s Brady decision has been interpreted, see 
Laurie L. Levenson, Discovery from the Trenches: The Future of Brady, 60 UCLA L. REV. 
DISCOURSE 74, 77 (2013) (“A Brady violation occurs when (1) evidence is favorable to the accused 
because it is exculpatory or impeaches a government witness; (2) the prosecution fails to disclose 
such evidence, either intentionally or inadvertently; and (3) the defendant is prejudiced because the 
undisclosed evidence is material.”). 
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struggle to fulfill their Brady obligation to provide the defense with exculpatory 
and impeachment evidence before trial.2 
Prosecutorial misconduct is an incredibly serious problem within the criminal 
justice system.  When prosecutors fail to comply with Brady, the costs are 
enormous.  Lives of the accused can be ruined by wrongful convictions.3  
Victims may suffer as past wounds are reopened and confidence in justice is 
lost.4  Taxpayers bear the financial burdens of appeals, post-trial litigation, and 
re-trials.5  This threatens respect for prosecutors and the criminal justice system 
as a whole.6 
Brady violations have been identified as one of the main causes of wrongful 
convictions in the United States.7  Since 1989, nearly 1,100 people have been 
exonerated after it was found that the prosecution had engaged in misconduct.8  
                                                 
 2. See, e.g., United States v. Parker, 790 F.3d 550, 563 (4th Cir. 2015); United States v. 
Sedaghaty, 728 F.3d 885, 898–902 (9th Cir. 2013); United States v. Tavera, 719 F.3d 705, 708 (6th 
Cir. 2013); United States v. Mahaffy, 693 F.3d 113, 119 (2d Cir. 2012); Goudy v. Basinger, 604 
F.3d 394, 401–02 (7th Cir. 2010); Wilson v. Beard, 589 F.3d 651, 660–62 (3d Cir. 2009); Mahler 
v. Kaylo, 537 F.3d 494, 503–04 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Aviles-Colon, 536 F.3d 1, 8 (1st 
Cir. 2008); Trammell v. McKune, 485 F.3d 546, 551–52 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Stevens, 
No. 08-CR-231 EGS, 2009 WL 6525926, at *1–2 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2009). 
 3. Since 1989, there have been 1,089 exonerations for official misconduct, 11,565 years total 
lost, and 10.5 average years lost per exoneration.  See Interactive Data Display, THE NAT’L 
REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/Exonerat 
ions-in-the-United-States-Map.aspx (last visited Dec. 15, 2017) [hereinafter “Interactive Data 
Display”] (including eleven cases of posthumous exoneration).  Official misconduct is defined as 
“[p]olice, prosecutors, or other government officials significantly abused their authority or the 
judicial process in a manner that contributed to the exoneree’s conviction.” Glossary, THE NAT’L 
REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (last visited Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/ 
exoneration/Pages/glossary.aspx; see also Radley Balko, The Untouchables: America’s 
Misbehaving Prosecutors, and the System That Protects Them, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 1, 2013), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/01/prosecutorial-misconductneworleans-louisiana_n_35 
29891.html (“Between 1973 and 2002, Orleans Parish prosecutors sent 36 people to death row.  
Nine of those convictions were later overturned due to Brady violations.  Four of those later resulted 
in exonerations.”). For information about all exonerations, see Interactive Data Display, supra note 
3 (indicating that since 1989, there were 2,130 exonerations, 18,590 total years lost, and 8.7 average 
years lost per exoneration). 
 4. See generally Balko, supra note 3 (using the story of an exoneree-turned-activist to argue 
that Brady violations are the product of a broken criminal justice system unable to be self-corrected 
in large part because prosecutors who enjoy high level of protection from the fallout of their Brady 
violations and the attorneys who would be pursuing action against the prosecutors are naturally 
reluctant to hold their own colleagues to account). 
 5. See Levenson, supra note 1, at 74 n. 52 (noting that wrongful convictions from 1989 to 
2011 in Illinois cost taxpayers approximately $214 million). 
 6. See Balko, supra note 3. 
 7. New Report: Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful Convictions, INNOCENCE PROJECT 
(Aug. 25, 2010), http://www.innocenceproject.org/new-report-prosecutorial-misconduct-and-
wrongful-convictions/ [hereinafter INNOCENCE PROJECT]. 
 8. See Interactive Data Display, supra note 3; Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Part 1: 
The Verdict: Dishonor, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Jan. 10, 1999), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ 
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Brady violations are the most common form of prosecutorial misconduct cited 
by courts when overturning convictions.9  According to legal scholar Cynthia E. 
Jones, the right to have exculpatory information turned over by the government 
is “one of the most unenforced constitutional mandates in the criminal justice 
system.”10 
The withholding of exculpatory and impeaching information is a topic 
national discussion.  A 2015 article by Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Judge 
Alex Kozinski11 has reverberated throughout the legal community.  In a 
dissenting opinion preceding his article, Judge Kozinski observed that there is 
an “epidemic of Brady violations abroad in the land.”12  United States 
Department of Justice (DOJ) attorneys responded to Judge Kozinski, denying 
that Brady violations by federal prosecutors were common and asserting that 
DOJ attorneys receive adequate training to not only avert Brady violations, but 
also do more than what Brady requires.13  Judge Kozinski is not alone in his 
observations.  United States District for the District of Columbia Judge Emmet 
Sullivan has been outspoken about Brady violations as well, even participating 
in a committee to draft a rule outlining the disclosure obligations of D.C. 
prosecutors.14  Scholars recently highlighted the too frequent problem of 
prosecutors in this country suppressing exculpatory information.15 
As part of the DOJ, the United States Attorney’s Office (USAO) is the top 
prosecutors’ office in the country.16  Few prosecutors’ offices are as revered as 
                                                 
watchdog/chi-020103trial1-story.html (sixty-seven death row inmates have granted new trials due 
to Brady violations). 
 9. See Balko, supra note 3; see also BENNETT L. GERSHMAN, PRELIMINARY MATERIALS, 
IN PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2017) [hereinafter 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT] (“A prosecutor’s violation of the obligation to disclose favorable 
evidence accounts for more miscarriages of justice than any other type of malpractice, but is rarely 
sanctioned by courts, and almost never by disciplinary bodies.”). 
 10. Cynthia E. Jones, A Reason to Doubt: The Suppression of Evidence and the Inference of 
Innocence, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 415, 434 (2010). 
 11. Hon. Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC iii, viii 
(2015). 
 12. United States v. Olsen, 737 F.3d 625, 626 (9th Cir. 2013) (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting). 
 13. Letter from Andrew D. Goldsmith, Assoc. Deputy Att’y Gen. & Nat’l. Crim. Discovery 
Coordinator, Off. of the Deputy Att’y Gen., & John F. Walsh, Chair, Att’y Gen.’s Advisory Comm., 
to the Geo. L.J. (Nov. 4, 2015), http://georgetownlawjournal.org/files/2015/11/DOJ-Response-to-
Kozinski.pdf. 
 14. See Zoe Tillman, D.C. Judges Weigh Rule to Curb Prosecutor Misconduct, THE NAT. L.J. 
(Feb. 3, 2016), http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202748711837/DC-Judges-Weigh-Rule-
to-Curb-Prosecutor-Misconduct?slreturn=20160516221225. 
 15. See, e.g., Nicholas R. Battey, Note, A Chink in the Armor? The Prosecutorial Immunity 
Split in the Seventh Circuit in Light of Whitlock, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 553, 562 (2014), 
https://illinoislawreview.org/wp-content/ilr-content/articles/2014/2/Battey.pdf (“While Brady 
creates a constitutional right to exculpatory evidence, given the development of the doctrine in the 
Supreme Court, it is unclear when this right vests, and to what evidence.”). 
 16. See generally Office of the United States Attorneys, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Apr. 6, 2017), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao/about-offices-united-states-attorneys (“The United States Attorney is 
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the USAO.17  The prosecutors from the USAO come from top schools18 and 
often forgo lucrative private sector jobs to become civil servants.19  Despite the 
national prominence of the DOJ and the USAO, the USAO made headlines for 
a number of Brady violations in the last decade: the Senator Ted Stevens case,20 
the Chandra Levy case,21 and several other cases22 have put the USAO in the 
news.23 
Responding to criticism of the USAO following the Stevens case, in 2009, 
then Attorney General Eric Holder said, “I am committed to ensuring that our 
prosecutors are provided sufficient training to understand fully their discovery 
obligations, and that they receive the support and resources necessary to do their 
jobs in a manner consistent with the proud traditions of this Department.” 24  The 
following Attorney General, Loretta Lynch, had little opportunity for Brady 
                                                 
the chief federal law enforcement officer in their district and is also involved in civil litigation 
where the United States is a party.”). 
 17. See, e.g., Brad Heath & Kevin McCoy, Prosecutors’ Conduct Can Tip Justice Scales, 
USA TODAY (Sept. 23, 2010, 1:31 PM), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/2010-09-22-federal-prosecutors-
reform_N.htm?csp=usat.me (“USA TODAY documented 201 criminal cases in the years that 
followed in which judges determined that Justice Department prosecutors — the nation’s most elite 
and powerful law enforcement officials — themselves violated laws or ethics rules.”); Erin Fuchs, 
America’s ‘Killer Elite’ Lawyers Are All in One Prosecutor’s Office in Manhattan, BUSINESS 
INSIDER (Nov. 7, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/why-the-southern-district-of-new-york-
is-so-prestigious-2013-11 (“The most prestigious law gig in the U.S. may be the U.S. attorney’s 
office in Manhattan.”). 
 18. See, e.g., Elise Baranouski, Joan Ruttenberg & Carolyn Stafford Stein, The Fast Track to 
a U.S. Attorney’s Office, BERNARD KOTEEN OFF. OF PUB. INT. ADVISING HARV. L. SCH. (2014), 
http://hls.harvard.edu/content/uploads/2008/06/fast-track-final.pdf; Graduates Share Advice on 
Careers in U.S. Attorney’s Office, COLUM. L. SCH. (Nov. 21, 2014), https://www.law.columbi 
a.edu/media_inquiries/news_events/2014/november2014/US-attorney (“Four Columbia Law 
School alumni currently working in the civil and criminal divisions of the U.S. Attorney’s Office 
for the Southern District of New York.”). 
 19. Graduates Share Advice, supra note 18 (discussing two students who left law firm jobs 
for the U.S. Attorney’s Office). 
 20. United States v. Stevens, No. 08-CR-231 EGS, 2009 WL 6525926, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 
2009). 
 21. David Benowitz, What The Chandra Levy Retrial Teaches Us About Defendants’ Rights, 
HUFFINGTON POST (May 26, 2016), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-benowitz/what-the-
chandra-levy-ret_b_10146094.html. 
 22. Andrew King-Ries & Beth Brennan, A Fall from Grace: United States v. W.R. Grace and 
the Need for Criminal Discovery Reform, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 313, 316 (2010). 
 23. See, e.g., Nedra Pickler, Justice Dept. Lawyers in Contempt for Withholding Stevens 
Documents, WASH. POST (Feb. 14, 2009) http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/artic 
le/2009/02/13/AR2009021303092.html (reporting on how Judge Emmet G. Sullivan held all three 
DOJ lawyers in contempt for not producing the documents by the deadline when the lawyers 
admitted to him that they had no reason to withhold the documents). 
 24. Attorney General Announces Increased Training, Review of Process for Providing 
Materials to Defense in Criminal Cases, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. (Apr. 14, 2009), https://www.just 
ice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-announces-increased-training-review-process-providing-material 
s-defense. 
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reform in her brief tenure.25  Questions loom about Jefferson “Jeff” Sessions’ 
ability to lead the DOJ away from more Brady trouble in light of the Brady 
scandals in his career as a prosecutor prior to his decades as a United States 
Senator.26 
During his career as Attorney General of Alabama, courts repeatedly 
concluded that Sessions violated Brady.27  Furthermore, in 1996, a judge called 
a Brady violation by Sessions’ office the worst he had ever seen and dismissed 
the case.28  Despite this extraordinary step, no appeal was taken by the office.29 
The New York Times editorial board called on the “feds” to “stop bad 
prosecutors”  by pointing out that the DOJ is in a unique position to monitor 
prosecutors.30  With prosecutors immune from civil suits and rarely facing any 
ethics sanctions,31 there is little to stop federal prosecutors from hiding Brady 
                                                 
 25. See Loretta Lynch Fast Facts, CNN (July 4, 2017) http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/1 
9/us/loretta-lynch-fast-facts/index.html (stating that former Attorney General Lynch only served 
from April 2015 to January 2017). 
 26. Drew Griffin, Scott Glover & Nelli Black, Jeff Sessions’ Office Accused of Prosecutorial 
Misconduct in the ‘90s, CNN POLITICS (Dec. 22, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/21/poli 
tics/jeff-sessions-prosecutorial-misconduct. 
 27. Shields v. Alabama, 680 So. 2d 969, 975 (Ala. Crim. App. 1996) (holding the prosecution 
violated Brady when it learned about but failed to disclose to the defendant a murder victim’s prior 
assault conviction in which the murder victim attacked someone in a drunken rage when the 
defendant was arguing that the victim was trying to kill him in a drunken rage); Hamilton v. 
Alabama, 677 So. 2d 1254, 1260–61 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995) (holding the prosecution violated 
Brady during a capital murder trial when it failed to disclose the plea agreement of a key witness 
who then went on to commit perjury). 
 28. Drew Griffin, Scott Glover & Nelli Black, Jeff Sessions’ Office Accused of Prosecutorial 
Misconduct in the ‘90s, CNN POLITICS (Dec. 22, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/21/politics/ 
jeff-sessions-prosecutorial-misconduct/. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Editorial, To Stop Bad Prosecutors, Call the Feds, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/06/opinion/to-stop-bad-prosecutors-call-the-feds.html?_r=0. 
 31. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976) (finding prosecutors immune from 
suits involving the violation of constitutional rights, but explaining such immunity is in the public 
interest); see e.g., Margaret Z. Johns, Unsupportable and Unjustified: A Critique of Absolute 
Prosecutorial Immunity, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 509, 535 (2011) 
The doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity in federal civil rights actions is 
unsupportable.  From the point of view of public policy, absolute prosecutorial immunity 
leads to wrongful prosecutions and convictions, ruins the lives of the wrongly accused, 
subjects crime victims to the painful and protracted relitigation of their experiences, 
impairs public safety, wastes public resources, and undermines public respect for, and 
confidence in, the criminal justice system.  Moreover, absolute prosecutorial immunity 
is historically unjustified.  Section 1983 was adopted to provide a federal civil rights 
remedy against Southern prosecutors who were using criminal prosecutions to deny 
newly freed slaves their civil rights, and to punish and deter Union officers and officials 
from enforcing those civil rights.  It was not intended to shield prosecutors from liability; 
on the contrary, it was intended to subject them to liability.  And finally, the doctrine 
generates conflicts and confusion that complicate and prolong civil rights actions for 
prosecutorial misconduct.” 
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and trying to win at all costs.32  While DOJ’s Civil Rights Division spent 
considerable efforts documenting troubling problems within local police 
departments33 at the local level, efforts by DOJ to police itself are at the very 
least, opaque under the eras of Lynch and Holder.34 
This Article addresses the DOJ’s historic opposition to reform and the 
problems that stem from a lack of interest in reform.  The USAO handles federal 
crimes and local crimes in the District of Columbia.35  Because of the District of 
Columbia’s uniqueness as a city without a state, the USAO prosecutes most of 
the crime there rather than the local District Attorney’s Office. The USAO for 
the District of Columbia is the largest USAO, so that it can accommodate the 
heavy caseload of both state and federal criminal cases. This Article focuses in 
part specifically on the USAO for DC.  It will show that the USAO record with 
respect to Brady has not been what it should be and will illustrate the many 
Brady violations revealed since 2000.  This Article will be the first to show that 
the USAO violates Brady multiple times a year.  In addition, this Article will 
show the numerous efforts at blocking Brady reform by the DOJ.  The Article 
will then survey the Brady violations under Sessions’ time as a prosecutor and 
evaluate the likelihood for significant reform while he is the Attorney General 
for the United States.  Finally, this Article will suggest for Brady reform for 
courts and other institutional players. 
                                                 
George A. Weiss, Prosecutorial Accountability After Connick v. Thompson, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 
199, 233 (2011) (“Notably, the only official receiving absolute immunity who is not neutral to the 
justice process–such as a witness, judge, or legislator–but acts in an argumentative and adversarial 
role is the prosecutor.”); David G. Savage, Supreme Court Rejects Damages for Innocent Man who 
Spent 14 Years on Death Row, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/ 
mar/30/nation/la-na-court-prosecutors-20110330 (reporting how the Supreme Court overturned a 
jury verdict that had awarded $14 million to an innocent man who sat on death row for fourteen 
years because it considered the man’s case to be one incident rather than part of a pattern of 
conduct). 
 32. See e.g., Malia N. Brink, A Pendulum Swung Too Far: Why the Supreme Court Must 
Place Limits on Prosecutorial Immunity, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 1, 9–18 (2009) (arguing that 
politics, whether it be from the election of state prosecutors or the appointment of federal 
prosecutors, 
creates a “win-at-all-costs” mentality that perversely incentivizes prosecutors to seek as many 
convictions as possible rather than justice); Adam Foss, A Prosecutor’s Vision for a Better Justice 
System, TED (Feb. 2016), https://www.ted.com/talks/adam_foss_a_prosecutor_s_vision_for_a_ 
better_justice_system?language=en (“[Prosecutors a]re judged internally and externally by [their] 
convictions and [their] trial wins.”). 
 33. Editorial, Consent Decrees, Racial Bias, and Policing, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 10, 2016),  
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/11/us/heres-how-racial-bias-plays-out-in-policing.html. 
 34. See Brink, supra note 32, at 21–22. 
 35. About Us, U.S. ATT’Y’S OFF. DIST. OF COLUM. (Feb 11, 2016), 
https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/about-us (“[The United States Attorney’s Office for the District 
of Columbia] is responsible not only for the prosecution of all federal crimes, but also for the 
prosecution of all serious local crime committed by adults in the District of Columbia.”). 
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I.  BRADY AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION 
Except in some circumstances, criminal defendants generally do not have a 
right to discovery in their federal criminal cases.36  They do, however, have a 
right to be provided exculpatory material of which the government is aware.37  
In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that “evidence favorable to an 
accused . . . where the evidence is material either to guilt or punishment”  must 
be disclosed to the defense.38  That disclosure is a due process right.39  Because 
of the unique role of the prosecutor in the U.S. criminal justice system, the 
Supreme Court has said that the government must “assist the defense in making 
its case.” 40  For the most part, criminal defendants and their attorneys have fewer 
resources than prosecutors and police.41  Because of the Supreme Court’s 
mandate and the limited resources of most indigent defendants and their public 
defender,42 the defense relies on prosecutors to be the ministers of justice that 
the Supreme Court has said that they must be.43 
                                                 
 36. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(2). 
 37. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 n.6 (1985). 
 41. See Lawrence F. Travis III & Bradley D. Edwards, INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
243–48 (Pamela Chester & Ellen S. Boyne eds., 2015) (stating that defense attorneys are typically 
less established attorneys, solo practitioners, or attorneys from small offices who have to deal with 
large caseloads); Kate Weisburd, Prosecutors Hide, Defendants Seek: The Erosion of Brady 
Through the Defendant Due Diligence Rule, 60 UCLA L. REV. 138, 175 (2012) 
There is ample evidence that prosecutors and defense lawyers (especially court-
appointed lawyers) are not equals.  While defense lawyers are expected to investigate 
and the failure to do so constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel, this constitutional 
rule does not—nor could it legitimately—reflect any assumption that defense lawyers 
have equal capacity to conduct an investigation as compared to the average prosecutor.”). 
 42. See, e.g., Luis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1095 (2016) (“These defendants, rendered 
indigent, would fall back upon publicly paid counsel, including overworked and underpaid public 
defenders.”); Weisburd, supra note 43, at 176. 
[I]ndigent criminal defendants are at a severe disadvantage. . . .  [T]he provision of 
indigent defense in this country is in crisis.  State and local public defender offices are 
underfunded.  Individual public defenders often handle over one hundred cases at a time, 
often with little or no investigative support.  Because of the funding crisis, court-
appointed lawyers often provide representation that violates their professional duties.  As 
a result, most court-appointed defense lawyers lack the investigative resources to 
discover Brady material after trial, much less before trial even begins.  The investigative 
resources at the disposal of an average prosecutor always outmatch those available to an 
average public defender or appointed lawyer. 
 43. See, e.g., Luis, 136 S. Ct. at 1095 (citing Census of Public Defender Offices, 2007: 
County-based and Local Public Defender Offices, DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, 10 (Sept. 2010)) (“As the Department of Justice explains, only 27 percent of county-
based public defender offices have sufficient attorneys to meet nationally recommended caseload 
standards.”); Matt Ford, A Near-Epiphany at the Supreme Court, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 30, 2016), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/03/a-near-epiphany-at-the-supreme-court/47603 
7/. 
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Giglio v. United States extended that obligation not just to exculpatory 
evidence, but also to impeachment evidence.44  Much of the evidence that the 
government fails to turn over is impeachment evidence—information that 
undermines the credibility of the government witness.45  Impeachment evidence 
is a broad category.46  Plea agreements,47 prior convictions,48 inconsistent 
                                                 
Underfunding and understaffing in state public-defender systems weakens the quality of 
legal representation they can provide to clients. Virtually all of Kentucky’s public 
defenders exceeded the American Bar Association’s recommended caseload in 2015.  
Minnesota’s public defenders took on almost double the ABA standard in 2010—
170,000 cases for fewer than 400 lawyers—and spent only an average of 12 minutes on 
each case outside the courtroom.  Some states face even greater crises.  In cash-strapped 
Louisiana, where 8 out of 10 defendants cannot afford a lawyer, the system is on the 
verge of collapse. 
 44. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (“When the reliability of a given witness 
may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility 
falls within this general rule.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 45. See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) (“The jury’s estimate of the truthfulness 
and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence, and it is upon 
such subtle factors as the possible interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant’s life 
or liberty may depend.”). 
 46. See Jones, supra note 10, at 415, 425–26 (2010). 
Impeachment evidence includes any information regarding a witness’s prior convictions, 
biases, prejudices, self-interests, or any motive to fabricate or curry favor with the 
government.  Impeachment evidence also consists of prior inconsistent statements of the 
witness and any prior failure of the witness to identify the defendant. The government 
must also disclose information that casts doubt on the ability of the witness to accurately 
perceive, recall, or report the facts related to the witness’s testimony, including mental 
instability, substance abuse, memory loss, or any other physical or mental impairment.  
In addition, Brady impeachment evidence includes any positive or negative inducements 
used to motivate a witness to testify on behalf of the government. 
(internal citations omitted). 
 47. Silva v. Brown, 416 F.3d 980, 991 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding a Brady violation when 
the prosecution failed to disclose that the one witness who placed the defendant at the scene of the 
murder had taken a plea deal); see, e.g., Silva v. Brown, 416 F.3d 980, 991 (9th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he 
prosecution’s secret deal with [its main witness] was material to Silva’s conviction for murder, and 
the State violated Silva’s due process rights by failing to disclose the deal to the defense.”); Monroe 
v. Angelone, 323 F.3d 286, 315–17 (4th Cir. 2003) (finding a Brady violation, in part, because the 
prosecution failed to disclose that their key witness had taken a plea deal); United States v. Sterba, 
22 F. Supp. 2d 1333, 1334–40 (M.D. Fla. 1998).  Following a mistrial due to prosecutorial 
misconduct, defendant’s motion for dismissal was granted.  Id. at 1339. Among the impeachment 
material that the government failed to disclose was a prior guilty plea for filing a false police report 
in a case that led to the arrest of an innocent man.  Id. at 1338.  This was impeachment material that 
should have been disclosed to the defense before trial because it signaled “severe credibility 
problems” of the government’s main witness. See id. 
 48. See, e.g., Wilson v. Beard, 589 F.3d 651, 660–62 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding a Brady violation 
in part because the prosecution failed to disclose that a key witness was a mentally ill man who was 
obsessed with being a law enforcement official and had been previously convicted of impersonating 
a police officer); Lewis v. United States 408 A.2d 303, 310–12 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (finding a Brady 
violation when federal prosecutors failed to disclose to the defense the FBI “rap sheets” of one of 
the prosecution’s witnesses). 
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accounts,49 promises of reward money,50 and other information51 that might 
diminish the weight of the witness’s testimony all fall into the category of 
impeachment material. 
The Court made clear that Brady extends to anyone involved in the 
investigation of the case.52  Thus, Brady’s requirements do not simply apply to 
what the prosecutor chooses to learn.53  Although sometimes the police, rather 
than the prosecutor, possesses the exculpatory information, the prosecutor 
nevertheless has a duty to learn of Brady information.54  Prosecutors cannot stick 
their heads in the sand as they prepare their cases.55 
                                                 
 49. See, e.g., Mahler v. Kaylo, 537 F.3d 494, 503–04 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding a Brady 
violation in a murder trial when the prosecution failed to disclose a witness’ pre-trial statements 
that were inconsistent with the witness’ testimony at trial even though the witness’ testimony was 
the only tying the defendant to the murder); see also Monroe, 323 F.3d at 315–17 (finding a Brady 
violation in part because the prosecution failed to disclose to the defense a key witness’ inconsistent 
statements).  But see United States v. Jones, 609 F. Supp. 2d 113 (D. Mass. 2009) 
[The government’s main witness’s] important inconsistent statements were not disclosed 
to Jones until the court conducted an in camera review of [the prosecution’s] notes, just 
before the suppression hearing was complete . . . Because [the government’s main 
witness’s] prior inconsistent statements were ultimately disclosed in time for his false 
testimony to be discredited, Jones has not been deprived of due process or otherwise 
prejudiced by the government’s misconduct. 
 50. See, e.g., Paula Reed Ward, Court Agrees to New Trial in 1995 Fire that Killed Three 
Firefighters, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Mar. 21, 2015), http://www.post-gazette.com/local/ci 
ty/2015/03/21/Court-agrees-to-new-trial-in-1995-fire-that-killed-three-firefighters/stories/201503 
210093. 
Gregory Brown, 37, had his original conviction overturned by Common Pleas Judge 
Joseph K. Williams III, who found that the prosecution withheld impeachment evidence 
from Brown’s defense concerning two critical witnesses who were promised reward 
money for their testimony.  The Allegheny County District Attorney’s office appealed 
that decision on three grounds, and on Friday, the Pennsylvania Superior Court issued a 
2-1 decision in Brown’s favor, finding that he was “thwarted by the commonwealth’s 
repeated denials that a reward had even been paid.” 
 51. See, e.g., Jells v. Mitchell, 538 F.3d 478, 506–07 (6th Cir. 2008) (finding a Brady violation 
in a capital murder and abduction case because the prosecution failed to disclose witness statements 
that cast doubt on whether an abduction occurred and evidence of the victim’s intoxication that 
would have mitigated the aggravating factors justifying capital punishment); Benn v. Lambert, 283 
F.3d 1040, 1056 (9th Cir. 2002) (“There was no evidence at trial to impeach [the government’s 
main witness’s] competence or his ability to recollect or perceive the events.  Thus, evidence of his 
drug use would have provided the defense with a new and different ground of impeachment.”); 
Boyette v. Lefevre, 246 F.3d 76, 92–93 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding a Brady violation because a fire 
marshal’s undisclosed report cast doubt on the government’s main witness’s ability to correctly 
identify the defendant). 
 52. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437 (1995). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id.  The Court said that: 
[U]nless . . . the adversary system of prosecution is to descend to a gladiatorial level 
unmitigated by any prosecutorial obligation for the sake of truth, the government simply 
cannot avoid responsibility for knowing when the suppression of evidence has come to 
portend such an effect on a trial’s outcome as to destroy confidence in its result. 
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The constitutional mandates and the Supreme Court’s interpretations of Brady 
are not the only rules that prosecutors must follow.56  Ethical rules particular to 
prosecutors require them to “seek justice.” 57  Indeed, the American Bar 
Association (ABA) Model Rule 3.858 and most state ethical rules require 
prosecutors to turn over exculpatory evidence.59  The Supreme Court has said: 
=xt 
The [prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a 
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern 
impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and 
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall 
win a case, but that justice shall be done.  As such, he is in a peculiar 
and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of 
which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.  He may 
prosecute with earnestness and vigor-indeed, he should do so.  But, 
while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones.  
It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to 
produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means 
to bring about a just one.60 
=xt 
Unfortunately, few prosecution offices have remained immune to Brady 
errors.61  Prosecution offices all over the country have been found to have 
                                                 
Id. at 439. 
 56. NAT’L PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 1-1.1 (NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N 2009) 
http://www.ndaa.org/pdf/NDAA%20NPS%203rd%20Ed.%20w%20Revised%20Commentary.pd
f. 
 57. Id. 
 58. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d), http://www.americanbar.org/groups/ 
professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/rule_3_8_special_
responsibilities_of_a_prosecutor.html. 
 59. Additionally, “[n]early half of the states require disclosure of evidence that is exculpatory 
or tends to negate guilt or reduce punishment, without requiring that the evidence be material.”    
Leonard Sosnov, Brady Reconstructed: An Overdue Expansion of Rights and Remedies, 45 N.M. 
L. REV. 171, 223 n. 122 (2014) (citing ALASKA R. CRIM P. 16(b)(3); 16A ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 
15.1(b)(8); ARK. R. CRIM. P. 17.1(d); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1054.1(e) (West 2013); COLO. R. CRIM. 
P. 16(a)(2); 4 CONN. PRAC., CRIM. P. § 40-11(a)(1); FLA. R. CRIM. P. R. 3.220(b)(4); HAW. R. 
PENAL. P. 16(b)(1)(vii); IDAHO CRIM. R. 16(a) (West 2013); ILL. S. CT. R. 412(c); MD. RULES 4-
263(d)(5); MASS. R. CRIM. P. 14(a)(1)(A)(iii); MICH. CT. R. 6.201(B)(1); MISS. URCCC 9.04 
(A)(6); MO. SUP. CT. R. 25.03(A)(9); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-15-322 (West 2013); N.J. R. 3:13-
3(b)(1); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. ART. 39.14(h) (West 2013); UTAH R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(4); VT. 
R. CRIM. P. 16(b)–(c); WASH. SUPER. CT. CR. R. 4.7 (a)(3); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.23(1)(h) (West 
2013); State v. Castor, 599 N.W.2d 201, 211 (Neb. 1999)).  North Carolina goes a step further and 
“mandates disclosure of the entire file of the prosecutor and all investigative agencies.”  Id. (citing 
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-903 (West 2013)). 
 60. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935). 
 61. See generally, David Keenan et al., The Myth of Prosecutorial Accountability After 
Connick v. Thompson: Why Existing Professional Responsibility Measures Cannot Protect Against 
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 203 (2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-
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violated their Due Process obligations to provide exculpatory evidence to the 
defense.62  In an egregious case, former New Orleans District Attorney Harry 
Connick Sr.63 stated that he had not read a case since he was elected District 
Attorney and admitted that he did not train his prosecutors on their Brady 
obligations.64  Despite the immense costs when prosecutors fail to uphold their 
due process obligations, consequences for prosecutors who withhold Brady are 
relatively rare.65 
                                                 
myth-of-prosecutorial-accountability-after-connick-v-thompson-why-existing-professional-
responsibility-measures-cannot-protect-against-prosecutorial-misconduct (“The lack of any 
external oversight of prosecutors’ offices creates an environment in which misconduct can go 
undetected and undeterred.”). 
 62. See, e.g., Tony Saavedra & Kelly Puente, In Rare Move, Judge Kicks Orange County D.A. 
off Case of Seal Beach Mass Shooting Killer Scott Dekraai, ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER (Mar. 12, 
2015), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/attorney-654000-county-case.html (“A Superior Court 
judge removed the Orange County District Attorney’s Office from the case against the deadliest 
killer in county history, saying . . . that the defendant’s right to a fair trial had been violated by false 
testimony and the withholding of evidence.”); Denis Slattery, Bronx Prosecutor Bashed and Barred 
from Courtroom for Misconduct, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 6, 2014), http://www.nydailynews.com/ 
new-york/bronx/bronx-prosecutor-barred-courtroom-article-1.1746238 (reporting on a case in 
which a judge banned a prosecutor barred from his courtroom because she failed to disclose Brady 
evidence that proved a defendant’s innocence). 
 63. See Bennett L. Gershman, Educating Prosecutors and Supreme Court Justices About 
Brady v. Maryland, 13 LOYOLA J. PUB. INT. L 518, 521 (2012) (describing Connick’s office as 
having “one of the worst records in the United States for concealing exculpatory evidence from 
defendants, and an office culture that was deliberately indifferent to the rights of defendants, 
especially in training and supervising prosecutors on compliance with Brady”); see also Balko, 
supra note 3 ([Therefore between 1973 and 2002,] “[eleven] percent of the men Connick’s office 
attempted to send to their deaths — for which prosecutors suppressed exculpatory evidence in the 
process — were later found to be factually innocent.”); John Hollway, Innocent on Death Row, 
SLATE (Oct. 5 2010), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2010/10/inn 
ocent_on_death_row.html (“According to the Innocence Project, a national organization that 
represents incarcerated criminals claiming innocence, 36 men convicted in Orleans Parish during 
Connick’s 30-year tenure as DA have made allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, and 19 have 
had their sentences overturned or reduced as a result.”). 
 64. See Bennett L. Gershman, Educating Prosecutors and Supreme Court Justices About 
Brady v. Maryland, 13 LOYOLA J. PUB. INT. L 518, 521 (2012) (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 
131 S. Ct. 1350, 1379 (2011)) (“Prosecutors would go to Connick with Brady questions, but 
Connick acknowledged that he ‘stopped reading law books . . . and looking at opinions’ when he 
was elected District Attorney. Further, as Thompson’s expert testified, Connick’s supervision 
regarding Brady was ‘the blind leading the blind.’”) (citing Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350, 
1380 (2011)); see also Keenan, supra note 63, at 208 (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 
1350, 1380 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)) (“Shortly after Connick’s retirement, ‘a survey of 
assistant district attorneys in the Office revealed that more than half felt they had not received the 
training they needed to do their jobs.’”). 
 65. See Angela J. Davis, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 
123–77 (James Cook & Dedi Felman eds., 2007); Denis Slattery, Bronx Prosecutor Bashed and 
Barred from Courtroom for Misconduct, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 6, 2014), http://www.nydaily 
news.com/new-york/bronx/bronx-prosecutor-barred-courtroom-article-1.1746238 (containing a 
link to the transcript from a hearing before Judge John Wilson in which he barred the prosecutor 
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A.  Brady in Practice 
Far more exculpatory material is withheld than is documented in published 
appellate opinions.66  Some Brady violations go undisclosed and entirely 
unnoticed by the defense and the court.67  When a prosecutor suppresses 
exculpatory information, the violation of Brady is by its very nature virtually 
impossible for the defense to discover or prove.68  Prosecutors may dismiss 
charges or make generous plea offers to avoid revealing the information prior to 
trial.69  In other instances, once the prosecution discloses the information and the 
defense files complaints or motions for sanctions over late disclosure, 
prosecutors then dismiss criminal charges or make generous plea offers to 
escape embarrassing litigation, thus avoiding written opinions that cast them in 
a bad light.70 
Some prosecutors may lack training or supervision to understand the extent 
of their obligations.  Prosecutors who willfully withhold evidence may know 
that they violate the law by doing so, so they conceal their conduct.71  Because 
prosecutors and police have “exclusive” access to the information and they are 
                                                 
from ever appearing before him again, however it is unclear if the prosecutor was reprimanded 
internally); Balko, supra note 3 
In the end, one of the most powerful positions in public service — a position that carries 
with it the authority not only to ruin lives, but in many cases the power to end them — is 
one of the positions most shielded from liability and accountability.  And the freedom to 
push ahead free of consequences has created a 
zealous conviction culture. 
Nedra Pickler, Justice Dept. Lawyers in Contempt for Withholding Stevens Documents, WASH. 
POST (Feb. 14, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/13/AR20 
09021303092.html (describing the noteworthy occurrence of a judge holding three DOJ lawyers in 
contempt for not producing the documents by the deadline). 
 66. See Balko, supra note 3 (“Courts most commonly deal with misconduct by overturning 
convictions. To get a new trial, however, a defendant must not only show evidence of prosecutorial 
misconduct, but must also show that without that misconduct the jury likely would 
have acquitted.”). 
 67. See id. 
Emily Maw, director of the New Orleans Innocence Project, a group that advocates for 
the wrongfully convicted, says violations in low-level cases are much less likely to come 
to light. ‘It’s expensive to discover a Brady violation.  They’re usually found after 
conviction, with the help of investigators and attorneys poring through police reports and 
prosecutors’ files. 
 68. Elizabeth Napier Dewar, Note, A Fair Trial Remedy for Brady Violations, 115 YALE L.J. 
1450, 1455 n. 23 (2006) (citing Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong Without a Remedy: The Effective 
Enforcement of the Duty of Prosecutors to Disclose Exculpatory Evidence, 22 OKLA. U.L. REV. 
833). 
 69. Andrew P. O’Brien, Reconcilable Differences: The Supreme Court Should Allow the 
Marriage of Brady and Plea Bargaining, 78 IND. L.J. 899, 907 (2003). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Keenan, supra note 63, at 209 (“[P]rosecutors who engage in willful misconduct 
presumably do not want to be discovered and therefore take steps to conceal their misdeeds.”). 
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ones who control when, what, if, and how Brady material is disclosed,72 it is 
difficult for defense attorneys to know whether that material exists.73  In other 
words, you do not know what you do not know.  This control over information 
by the government means that the defense does not learn of favorable material 
in many instances.  Oftentimes the defense only learns of exculpatory evidence 
by accident.74 
With over ninety-five percent of federal convictions obtained by a guilty 
plea,75 it is easy for prosecutors to escape the chronicling of their Brady 
violations.76  In United States v. Ruiz, the Supreme Court held that a defendant 
cannot withdraw a guilty plea where the government has withheld impeachment 
information.77  The Court wrote, “[w]hen a defendant pleads guilty he or she, of 
course, forgoes not only a fair trial, but also other accompanying constitutional 
guarantees” 78 and that “a constitutional obligation to provide impeachment 
information during plea bargaining, prior to entry of a guilty plea, could 
seriously interfere with the Government’s interest in securing those guilty pleas 
                                                 
 72. See Bruce A. Green, Beyond Training Prosecutors About Their Disclosure Obligations: 
Can Prosecutors’ Offices Learn from Their Lawyers’ Mistakes?, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2161, 2175 
(2010) [hereinafter “Green I”] (“Claims about the frequency of disclosure error are hard to prove 
or disprove, precisely because prosecutors have not systematically studied their mistakes. No one 
else can do so, given that prosecutors ordinarily have exclusive access to information needed to 
assess how and why—and often whether—disclosure errors occurred.”); see also Weisburd, supra 
note 43, at 146 (explaining that the Supreme Court removed the requirement that the defense 
request exculpatory evidence from the prosecution because the prosecution would know best 
whether it had exculpatory evidence). 
 73. See Sara Gurwitch, When Self-Policing Does Not Work: A Proposal for Policing 
Prosecutors in Their Obligation to Provide Exculpatory Evidence to the Defense, 50 SANTA CLARA 
L. REV. 303, 306–07 (2010) 
The prosecution’s Brady obligation is largely self-enforced: prosecutors determine what 
is exculpatory and what must be turned over to the defense.  As a result, lack of 
compliance with the Brady rule will often go undetected, and it is fair to assume that 
most Brady violations go undiscovered. . . .  Brady violations often come to light during 
trial or post-conviction, usually by way of re-investigation or fortuity.  The type of full-
scale re-investigation that is typically necessary to discover previously suppressed 
exculpatory evidence post-conviction is rarely conducted. . . .  Unfortunately, as a 
consequence, the actual number of Brady violations remains unknown. 
 74. See Jones, supra note 10, at 433. 
 75. See Lindsey Devers, Plea and Charge Bargaining: Research Summary, BUREAU OF JUST. 
ASSISTANCE U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST. (Jan. 24, 2011), https://www.bja.gov/Publications/PleaBargain 
ingResearchSummary.pdf. 
 76. See Keenan, supra note 63, at 210 
[T]he vast majority of known instances of prosecutorial misconduct come to light only 
during the course of a drawn-out trial or appellate proceeding. . . . But most criminal 
cases in the United States result in plea bargains, which are rarely the subject of extensive 
investigation or judicial review, creating a heightened risk of undetected prosecutorial 
misconduct in the plea bargaining context. 
 77. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 624–25 (2002). 
 78. Id. at 628. 
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that are factually justified.” 79  Ruiz does not justify withholding evidence of 
innocence, rather simply evidence that can be used to impeach.80  Ruiz’s holding, 
however, means that even if a defendant discovers the suppression of favorable 
information that impeaches the government’s version of events, after a guilty 
plea there is no recourse or remedy for the defendant and there will be no court 
opinions regarding the prosecutor’s conduct.81  But Brady simply does not 
protect defendants who plead guilty.82 
One of the reasons that Brady violations persist is that prosecutors rarely 
suffer consequences for withholding favorable information from the defense.83  
Prosecutors have immunity for civil rights violation for withholding Brady 
information.84  It is almost unheard of for prosecutors to go to jail85 or lose their 
                                                 
 79. Id. at 631. 
 80. Ellen Yaroshefsky, Ethics and Plea Bargaining: What’s Discovery Got to Do With It?, 
23 ABA SEC. CRIM. JUS. (2008) 
 81. Id. 
 82. See Cynthia Alkon, The Right to Defense Discovery in Plea Bargaining Fifty Years after 
Brady v. Maryland, 38 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 407, 408 (2014). 
 83. See Gurwitch, supra note 75, at 309 (“The ongoing nature of this problem strongly 
suggests that the current system for sanctioning Brady violations–only granting the defendant a 
new trial when suppressed Brady evidence is discovered, and the defendant is able to meet Brady’s 
materiality standard—is not effective.”); see Weisburd, supra note 43, at 146–47 (“In practice, 
prosecutors often have little incentive to comply with Brady, and there are no external policing 
mechanisms to determine whether a prosecutor has not complied with Brady.”). 
 84. See Gurwitch, supra note 75, at 314–15 (“The repeated reaffirmance of the Imbler rule of 
absolute prosecutorial immunity is a seemingly insurmountable obstacle to sanctioning prosecutors 
for Brady violations with financial penalties.”). 
 85. See, e.g., id. at 318–19 
While state penal laws contemplate the prosecution of prosecutors who violate Brady, 
they are so infrequently enforced that the possibility of prosecution barely warrants a 
mention.  One anomalous case is that of the prosecutor who, in 2006, handled the 
prosecution of members of the Duke University lacrosse team on rape and kidnap 
charges.  The prosecutor committed various types of misconduct, including withholding 
exculpatory DNA test results. Subsequent to being disbarred, the prosecutor was found 
guilty of criminal contempt and sentenced to a jail term of twenty-four hours.  This case 
was highly unusual, and was surely influenced by the national publicity it attracted, as 
well as the resources of the defendants who were the victims of the prosecutorial 
misconduct at issue.  In more typical cases, the prosecution of attorneys who violate 
Brady is nonexistent, thus rendering the deterrent value of the threat of prosecution to 
nearly nothing. 
Cadene A. Russell, When Justice Is Done: Expanding A Defendant’s Right to the Disclosure of 
Exculpatory Evidence on the 51st Anniversary of Brady v. Maryland, 58 HOW. L.J. 237, 256 (2014) 
(“In 2013, for the first time in five decades, a prosecutor would serve time in jail for wrongfully 
convicting an innocent man. Remarkably, fifty-one years of prosecutorial misconduct in violation 
of Brady has only seen this one instance where a prosecutor will be imprisoned for this wrongful 
conduct.”); Mark Godsey, For the First Time Ever, a Prosecutor Will Go to Jail for Wrongfully 
Convicting an Innocent Man, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 8, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost. 
com/mark-godsey/for-the-first-time-ever-a_b_4221000.html; Balko, supra note 3: 
[S]omeone could bring criminal charges against a misbehaving prosecutor.  But this is 
vanishingly rare. While there’s no authoritative count of the number of times it’s 
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bar license.86  It is even rare for prosecutors to even be referred to bar counsel87 
or mentioned by name in published opinions.88  It appears that prosecutor offices 
rarely fire or demote prosecutors who violated defendants’ rights in this way.89 
With more than ninety percent of cases resolved by plea90 and no obligation 
to turn over impeachment information, and given that there is no appeal of guilty 
                                                 
happened, a 2011 Yale Law Journal article surveying the use of misconduct sanctions 
found that the first such case to reach a verdict in the U.S. was in 1999.  (The jury 
acquitted.)  More recently, the 2006 Duke lacrosse case resulted in criminal contempt 
charges against Durham County District Attorney Mike Nifong.  He was disbarred and 
sentenced to a day in jail. 
 86. See, e.g., Gurwitch, supra note 75, at 317 (describing a study that “[f]ound just seven 
cases where a prosecutor was referred to a disciplinary body due to a Brady violation” with the 
following results: “Four of the seven referrals resulted in discipline: a private reprimand, a public 
reprimand, a suspension of three months, and a suspension of six months.”); 
Keenan, supra note 63, at 220. 
Given the Supreme Court’s repeated endorsement of professional discipline as the 
appropriate vehicle for addressing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, one might 
suppose that state bar agencies frequently sanction prosecutors. In fact, prosecutors are 
rarely held accountable for violating ethics rules. . . . [A] study by the Center for Public 
Integrity found 2012 appellate cases between 1970 and 2003 in which prosecutorial 
misconduct led to dismissals, sentence reductions, or reversals. Yet prosecutors faced 
disciplinary action in only forty-four of those cases, and seven of these actions were 
eventually dismissed. 
Russell, supra note 87, at 257 (stating that an investigation by the newspaper USA Today into 201 
cases involving misconduct of federal prosecutors found that only one prosecutor ‘was barred even 
temporarily from practicing law for misconduct’). 
 87. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 10, at 415, 436–37 (“While the use of the state bar disciplinary 
process is a viable option, numerous studies and reports have shown that prosecutors are generally 
not referred for disciplinary action for Brady misconduct, and it is extremely rare that such a referral 
results in professional discipline.”); see also Adam M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming: 
Naming Attorneys to Reduce Prosecutorial Misconduct, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1059, 1096 (2009) 
(“[W]e cannot expect judges to begin referring more cases to bar disciplinary committees or to 
castigate prosecutors by name in judicial opinions simply because legal scholars suggest that they 
do so.”); CAL. COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT 73 (Gerald Uelmen ed., 
2008) (discussing reluctance by judges to refer prosecutors for professional discipline for Brady 
violations), http://www.ccfaj.org/documents/CCFAJFinalReport.pdf 
 88. See, e.g., Gershowitz, supra note 89, at 1062 (“[M]any judges go to great lengths to redact 
the names of misbehaving prosecutors from trial transcripts quoted in judicial opinions.”); Balko, 
supra note 3 (“[T]hrowing out a conviction is intended to ensure due process for a given defendant 
— not to punish a wayward prosecutor. Appellate court decisions that overturn convictions due to 
prosecutorial misconduct rarely even mention the offending prosecutor by name.”); see also Green 
I, supra note 74, at 2180 (“In most jurisdictions, disciplinary agencies keep their findings and files 
confidential except when they issue public sanctions.”). 
 89. See, e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 100 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(noting that the prosecutor sued in that case was “never disciplined or fired a single prosecutor for 
violating Brady”). 
 90. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (“Ninety-seven percent of federal 
convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.”); Lindsey 
Devers, supra note 77; Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics: 2003, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
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pleas, little opportunity to hear of exculpatory material post-trial, there are 
simply fewer opportunities for prosecutors to get caught in withholding helpful 
materials from the defense than in a system where more trials take place. 
II.  DOJ BRADY FAILURES 
In their open letter, federal prosecutors Andrew Goldsmith and John F. Walsh 
wrote that “Judge Kozinski proffered little support for the purported epidemic 
of Brady violations.” 91  The prosecutors distinguished Brady violations where 
there was a finding of deliberate misconduct and then wrote, “[t]wo cases over 
fifteen years . . . is still two cases too many.” 92  Thus, the prosecutors are 
suggesting that there were only two cases of deliberate Brady violations in over 
fifteen years. 
There are a variety of reasons why findings of deliberate misconduct are rarely 
made. First, whether the Brady violation is purposeful or not is part of courts’ 
analysis in determining a Brady violation.93 When making such findings, judges 
may want to protect young prosecutors.94  Second, some public defenders may 
not want to accuse prosecutors of intentional Brady violation since defense 
attorneys are repeat players and may have to face the same prosecutor again.95  
Third, it is worth considering that in cases in which there is an acquittal, there is 
no reason for parties to do a post-mortem on the case.  No appellate lawyer will 
look at the file if there is no conviction to appeal.  Finally, litigation of Brady 
violations often times takes place years after trial and purposeful violations of 
Brady by prosecutors are difficult to prove without an admission on the part of 
a prosecutor—a rare occurrence without a smoking gun.96 
The distinction of purposeful as opposed to reckless Brady violations hardly 
matters to the person who loses years of his life to prison.  Any failure by the 
top prosecutor’s office to disclose Brady material should be mourned and 
                                                 
STATISTICS 439 (2003), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/208756NCJRS.pdf (finding 
97.1% of convictions in U.S. district courts in 2001 were due to guilty pleas). 
 91. Goldsmith & Walsh, supra note 13. 
 92. Id. 
 93. United States v. Dimas, 3 F.3d 1015, 1020 (7th Cir. 1993) (factoring into the Brady 
analysis whether the prosecutor had acted in bad faith); United States v. Jackson, 780 F.2d 1305, 
1312 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating in dicta that, when the defendant alleges the prosecution had used 
false testimony, the court considers whether the prosecution knowingly used such testimony when 
assessing a Brady claim). 
 94. See Gershowitz, supra note 89, at 1062 (“[T]here are entrenched reasons why judges are 
reluctant to call prosecutors on the carpet. Many judges were former prosecutors, and there is a 
general instinct for people to protect their own. Indeed, even among judges who were not 
prosecutors, there is still a reluctance to chastise fellow lawyers.”). 
 95. Keenan, supra note 63, at 211. 
 96. See, e.g., Mara Leveritt, Prosecutors Have All the Power, ARK. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2014), 
https://www.arktimes.com/arkansas/prosecutors-have-all-the-power/Content?oid=3452595 
(describing a case in which, even six years after the defendant’s conviction, a prosecutor refused to 
turn over a tape containing exculpatory evidence until ordered to by a federal judge). 
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studied so that it is not repeated.  By focusing on purposeful Brady violations, 
prosecutors again minimize the serious problem of non-disclosure of 
exculpatory information by their office. 
To consider whether the violations are as rare as claimed, this Article will 
delve deep into the U.S. documented Brady record.  Many more Brady violations 
are likely given that only the ones brought to the attention of a court or a 
defendant are the Brady violations that surface.  Contrast that with the Superior 
Court cases prosecuted by the United States Attorney’s Office in the District of 
Columbia. 
A.  United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia 
Overall the United States Attorney’s Office prosecutes tens of thousands of 
cases every year.97  But very few go to trial.98  With dismissals, diversion 
programs, and guilty pleas, the numbers of cases that make it to trial are tiny.99  
Consider that in 2010 of the over 166,000 criminal cases referred by law 
enforcement, only 3,056 went to trial in all of the federal district courts in the 
entire country.100  Meanwhile in D.C. Superior Court, a single courthouse, the 
United States Attorney’s Office reviewed almost 27,000 cases, 1,774 went to 
trial.101  There were only fifteen trials in 2010 in United States District Court for 
the District of Columbia.102  In 2013 only 4.29% of the total cases referred 
actually went to trial in federal district court in the United States vs. 8.71% of 
the total cases referred in D.C. Superior Court.103  The often-cited statistic of 
ninety-seven percent of federal cases resolved by guilty plea only takes into 
account convictions.104  Many cases are never brought, dismissed, or diverted 
and do not result in any guilty finding, much less a conviction.105  Though just 
over ninety percent of convictions in D.C. Superior Court in 2015 were via guilty 
plea,106  forty-seven percent of defendants prosecuted by the United States 
                                                 
 97. United States Attorneys’ Annual Statistical Report: Fiscal Year 2015, U.S. DEP’T. OF 
JUSTICE 2–4, https://www.justice.gov/usao/file/831856/download. 
 98. Id. at 5–7. 
 99. Id. 
 100. United States Attorneys’ Annual Statistical Report: Fiscal Year 2010, U.S. DEP’T. OF 
JUSTICE 
8–10, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy/2011/09/01/10statrpt.pdf. 
 101. Id. at 15–16. 
 102. Id. at 49.  This appears to be consistent with other years.  In 2013 there were fifteen jury 
trials and one bench trial. United States Attorneys’ Annual Statistical Report: Fiscal Year 2013, 
U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE 51 (2013), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/usao/legacy/2014/09/22/13statrpt.pdf. [hereinafter U.S. 
Attorneys’ Statistical Report FY 2013]. 
 103. See U.S. Attorneys’ Statistical Report FY 2013, supra note 102, at 14–15, 51. 
 104. Id. at 9. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Office of the United States Attorneys, United States Attorneys’ Annual Statistical Report: 
Fiscal Year 2015, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE 65 (2015), 
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Attorney’s Office who went to trial in the D.C. Superior Court were found not 
guilty in 2013.107  In D.C. Superior Court, defendants are 3.2 times more likely 
to go to trial than in federal court.108  Given that the same U.S. Attorney’s Office 
that prosecutes in D.C. Superior Court also prosecutes in United States District 
Court for District of Columbia, it is helpful to examine that office109 since no 
U.S. Attorney’s Office tries more cases.110 
Senator Ted Stevens was prosecuted and convicted in United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia before Judge Emmett Sullivan in 2008.111  
Because he was a United States Senator, he was prosecuted by the Public 
Integrity Section of the DOJ as well as by Assistant United States Attorneys 
from the Alaska office.112  After his conviction, it became clear that the 
government had withheld exculpatory material from the defense.113  Troubled 
by the allegations of misconduct, Judge Sullivan ordered an independent inquiry 
into the conduct of the prosecutors while the DOJ launched its own 
investigation.114  Judge Sullivan also vacated the convictions of the Senator.115  
Attorney General Eric Holder later declared that he would not be retried.116 
                                                 
https://www.justice.gov/usao/resources/annual/statistical-reports [hereinafter U.S. Attorneys’ 
Statistical Report FY 2015] (finding in 2015 1,920 felony convictions, 1,735 of which were from 
guilty pleas). 
 107. See U.S. Attorneys’ Statistical Report FY 2013, supra note 102, at 
15. 
 108. Id. at 14–15, 48 (stating that the D.C. Superior Court had disposed of 1,774 cases in that 
year while there were still 554 cases pending in the District Court for the District of Columbia). 
 109. The author notes that she was a defense attorney in the District of Columbia and can attest 
that there are many ethical, candid attorneys who work there. 
 110. See U.S. Attorneys’ Statistical Report FY 2013, supra note 102, at 14–15, 48 (looking at 
the cases presented both in D.C. Superior Court and in the District Court for the District of 
Columbia).  The lack of the federal sentencing guidelines and fewer mandatory minimums make 
Superior Court a less risk for a defendant to go to trial. 
 111. United States v. Stevens, No. 08-CR-231 EGS, 2009 WL 6525926, at *1 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 
2009); see generally Jeffrey Toobin, Casualties of Justice: The Justice Department Clearly 
Wronged Senator Ted Stevens.  Did It Also Wrong One of His Prosecutors?, THE NEW YORKER 
(Jan. 3, 2011), http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/01/03/casualties-of-justice (describing 
DOJ’s misconduct in Senator Stevens’ case and the fates of the DOJ prosecutors). 
 112. See Toobin, supra note 111. 
 113. Stevens, 2009 WL 6525926, at *1; see The Ted Stevens Scandal, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 2, 
2009), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123863051723580701. 
 114. Stevens, 2009 WL 6525926, at *2. 
 115. Id. at *2 (“The verdict is hereby set aside and the indictment is hereby dismissed with 
prejudice.”). 
 116. Neil A. Lewis, Justice Dept. Moves to Void Stevens Case, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/02/us/politics/02stevens.html; see The Ted Stevens Scandal, 
supra note 113 (“Attorney General Eric Holder . . . promised a ‘thorough’ probe into the conduct 
of prosecutors, which is the least the Department owes Mr. Stevens.”). 
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The case resulted in embarrassment for the DOJ.  Newspapers all over the 
country reported on the story.117  The high-profile status of the defendant, the 
judge’s extraordinary steps in ordering an inquiry, the twin investigations into 
the conduct of the lawyers,118 and later a suicide by one of the prosecutors119 and 
finally the Senator’s death,120 no doubt, led to making the Senator Stevens case 
a significant news story that remained in the press for years.  Two years after the 
prosecution, in a piece in the New Yorker, Jeffrey Toobin wrote that the 
prosecution of Senator Stevens was “profoundly unjust” and said that “what is 
indisputable is that the government did not play fair with Ted Stevens.”121 
There were a number of things that were done wrong in the prosecution of 
Senator Stevens.  The government sent a witness subpoenaed by both the 
defense and government was back home to Alaska.122  During trial, prosecutors 
claimed the witness became ill.123  Post-trial, an F.B.I. agent alleged that the 
government sent home the witness because the government discovered that he 
was a poor witness after a mock examination of him.124  Although prosecutors, 
particularly prosecutors from the Public Integrity Section, could have granted 
open file discovery to the Stevens defense team, the prosecutors did not.125  They 
also withheld information about their main witness—a cooperator—against 
Senator Stevens.126  After a decision was made by the Attorney General to 
dismiss the case, Judge Sullivan said in open court, “[i]n nearly twenty-five 
years on the bench, I’ve never seen anything approaching the mishandling and 
misconduct that I’ve seen in this case.” 127 
                                                 
 117. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Justice Dept. Moves to Void Stevens Case, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/02/us/politics/02stevens.html; Shelley Murphy, Top 
Judge Wants US Prosecutor Disciplined: Says Evidence Was Withheld at Trial, BOSTON GLOBE 
(July 3, 2007), 
http://archive.boston.com/news/local/articles/2007/07/03/top_judge_wants_us_prosecutor_discipl
ined/. 
 118. Charlie Savage, Prosecutors Face Penalty in ‘08 Trial of a Senator, N.Y. TIMES (May 
24, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/25/us/politics/2-prosecutors-in-case-of-senator-ted-
stevens-are-suspended.html. 
 119. Charlie Savage, Stevens Case Prosecutor Kills Himself, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/28/us/politics/28stevens.html. 
 120. See Toobin, supra note 115. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Carrie Johnson & Del Quentin Wilber, Holder Asks Judge to Drop Case Against Ex-
Senator, WASH. POST (Apr. 2, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/04/01/AR2009040100763.html (“The Justice Department asked U.S. 
District Judge Emmet G. Sullivan to drop the case after learning that prosecutors had failed to turn 
over notes that contradicted testimony from their key witness.”). 
 127. Transcript of Record at 3, United States v. Stevens, No. 08-CR-231 EGS, 2009 WL 
6525926 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2009). 
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Both the Judge Kozinski article in the Georgetown Law Journal128 and the 
letter from the prosecutors addressed the Senator Stevens case.  In his article, 
Judge Kozinski applauds Judge Sullivan for holding the prosecutors to account 
and condemns what he sees as DOJ’s self-congratulatory attempts at half-
hearted reforms.129  In contrast, the prosecutors’ letter acknowledges that the 
Stevens prosecution “involved significant discovery failures and deserves to be 
held up as an object lesson to prosecutors,”130 but fails to recognize those failures 
are of constitutional dimensions as Brady lapses.  The letter continues that the 
“Department’s efforts in the aftermath of that case also deserve discussion.”131  
Those include discovery boot camp for new prosecutors and annual discovery 
training for the experienced and a new position of “national criminal discovery 
coordinator.”132 
The Senator Stevens case was followed by fallout from what appears to be 
another significant Brady problem by homicide prosecutors at the USAO—the 
Chandra Levy case.  Chandra Levy was a Washington D.C. intern who went 
missing in July 2001.133  Her disappearance made national headlines when it was 
revealed that she had been in a romantic relationship with a married 
congressman, Gary Condit.134  About ten months later her body was discovered 
in Rock Creek Park in Washington, DC.135  The case remained open for many 
years until a man with no relationship with Ms. Levy was arrested in 2009 and 
prosecuted largely on the strength of a government informant.136  There was no 
DNA nor eyewitnesses to the offense, but in 2010 the man identified by the 
informant was convicted.137 
In 2013, lawyers138 for the man filed a motion for a new trial.139  A post-trial 
Brady disclosure made to the trial judge while the appeal was pending cast 
                                                 
 128. See Kozinski, supra note 11, at xxiii. 
 129. Id. at xxiii–iv. 
 130. Goldsmith & Walsh, supra note 13. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Scott Higham & Sylvia Moreno, Who Killed Chandra Levy?, WASH. POST SPECIAL 
SERIES (July 13–27, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/metro/specials/chandra/. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Keith L. Alexander, Prosecutor in Retrial of Man Charged in Levy Murder Acknowledges 
‘[M]istake’, WASH. POST (Nov. 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/public-
safety/prosecutor-in-retrial-of-man-charged-in-levy-murder-acknowledges-
mistake/2015/11/20/ab31854c-8fbc-11e5-ae1f-af46b7df8483_story.html. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Disclosure: one of those lawyers, Jonathan W. Anderson, is the husband of this Article’s 
author. 
 139. Keith L. Alexander & Clarence Williams, Defense Attorneys in Chandra Levy Murder 
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significant doubt on the veracity of the government’s cooperating witness’s trial 
testimony.140  The defense argued in their request for a new trial that the 
information had been in the possession of the government since the 2010 trial 
and that the government violated Brady.141  In May of 2015 prosecutors dropped 
their long-standing opposition to a new trial on the eve of their attorneys having 
to testify at the hearing on the motion.142  The timing of the government’s non-
opposition to the new trial–a year and half after the request for a new trial and 
the Friday before a long weekend143 that was to be followed by Tuesday morning 
testimony by current and former Assistant United States Attorneys–made it seem 
as if prosecutors were either trying to protect those lawyers or protect the 
reputation of the office.144  In 2016, the government announced that it would no 
longer seek to re-try the man accused and dismissed the case against him.145 
Those two high-profile cases were not the only Brady scandals in the D.C. 
legal community that involved the USAO.  In 2012, a United States Attorney 
admitted to withholding information from a criminal defendant back in 1985.146  
Among the information withheld from the defense was that three witnesses saw 
two men, who were never charged in the alley where the decedent was killed.147  
Eight men, ages sixteen to twenty-one, were convicted of first degree murder.148  
One of those men died in prison before this information was exposed.149 
Brady violations have been a recurring problem in the District of Columbia 
for years.  In 2004, the Washington Post reported that another former Assistant 
United States Attorney (AUSA) in the District of Columbia failed to disclose 
that he gave to government witnesses sums of money that went beyond amounts 
                                                 
 140. Id. 
 141. See Alexander, supra note 141. 
 142. Keith L. Alexander & Mary Pat Flaherty, New Trial Likely for Man Convicted of Killing 
Intern Chandra Levy, WASH. POST (May 22, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/new-trial-likely-for-man-convicted-of-killing-
intern-chandra-levy/2015/05/22/d5c5ac20-00c4-11e5-833c-a2de05b6b2a4_story.html. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Matthew Barakat, Reliance on Jailhouse Informant Dooms Chandra Levy Case, WASH. 
POST (July 29, 2016), https://apnews.com/09d874ae2c7c47feb4060e8e02535c44/after-charges-
dropped-mystery-levys-death-unresolved. 
 146. Keith L. Alexander, Ex-Prosecutor Admits Withholding Evidence Before Trial in ‘84 
Killing, WASH. POST (May 3, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ex-prosecutor-admits-
withholding-evidence-before-trial-in-84-killing/2012/05/03/gIQAXiHB0T_story.html (“[Former 
AUSA] Goren acknowledged that he did not disclose that one of his key witnesses had lied to 
authorities about a suspect’s whereabouts at the time of the killing before taking the stand in the 
1985 trial” and that “he kept some information from defense attorneys for the men, six of whom 
are still behind bars.”) 
 147. Id.  (“Some of those three witnesses identified the two men by name.  [Former AUSA] 
Goren said he checked out those accounts but thought them incorrect, which is why he didn’t pass 
that information to the defense.”). 
 148. Id.  (“Eight men . . . [were] sentenced to “between [thirty-five years] and life in prison.”). 
 149. Id. 
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necessary to compensate witnesses for the time spent preparing to testify.150  
This failure to disclose deprived the defense of the ability to cross-examine on 
this interest-bias.151  Although the United States Attorney’s Office knew of the 
conduct by 1998, as a result of an investigation, the information was not made 
public until five years later.152  As a result of the disclosures, three men were 
released early from prison.153 
Yet another federal prosecutor was taken to task in a published opinion by the 
District of Columbia Court of Appeals in 2015 for failing to disclose an 
exculpatory statement by a witness in a case that went to trial in 2002.154  While 
he was found to have violated ethical rules by intentionally withholding 
information, he was ultimately not sanctioned. 
In the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the Assistant 
United States Attorneys that were handling a kidnapping case were scolded for 
failing to turn over impeachment material.155 
In 2011 the Washington Post reported that a Superior Court judge granted a 
retrial and found that the prosecutor made “repeated, blatant Brady violations 
and misrepresentations”  that resulted in a young man being convicted in 2004 
when he was just seventeen years old.156  After nearly seven years behind bars 
the young man was acquitted in the retrial after the information was disclosed to 
the defense.157  The then acting United States Attorney wrote in a statement that 
much of the problems in the case centered on timing rather than a failure to 
disclose.158  The Washington Post article then goes on to write about four other 
cases between 2006-2009 of Brady violations where trial judges took action.159  
In another case mentioned in the article, the trial judge found that the Assistant 
                                                 
 150. Henri E. Cauvin, Misconduct Probe Cuts Sentences in D.C. Case, WASH. POST (Dec. 24, 
2004), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A23453-2004Dec23.html. 
 151. See id. (“A number of people connected to the case received vouchers. . . And many of 
the people who were paid were not even witnesses, the lawyers found.”). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. In re Kline, 113 A.3d 202, 204 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Kline was originally sanctioned with a 
thirty-day suspension from the practice of law, but that was appealed and Mr. Kline prevailed 
because there was legitimate confusion regarding his obligations under DC’s Rules of Professional 
Conduct.  Id. at 215. 
 155. Jordan Weissmann, Prosecutors in Kidnapping Case Rebuked over Brady, THE BLT 
(June 24, 2009), http://legaltimes.typepad.com/blt/2009/06/prosecutors-in-kidnapping-case-
rebuked-over-brady.html (“‘I have got to tell you Mr. Hegyi, I think the government is making 
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 156. Keith L. Alexander, D.C. Judges Question Prosecutors’ Roles in Criminal Cases 
Resulting in Mistrials, Dismissals, WASH. POST (Oct. 16, 2011), 
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resulting-in-mistrials-dismissals/2011/10/07/gIQAfFuypL_story.html. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
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United States Attorney withheld the information “conscious, deliberately and as 
a tactic.”160 
Prosecutors withholding Brady do not always make the news, but Brady 
problems rear their heads in run of the mill cases that get little attention.  Since 
2000,161 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has found Brady violations 
in a significant number of cases.162  In others the Court of Appeals has taken 
issue with timing of disclosures163 or the materiality of the information withheld 
but still found (or assumed) exculpatory material was withheld.164  All in all 
                                                 
 160. Id. 
 161. Given that the prosecutors who penned the open letter in response to Judge Kozinski’s 
piece only looked back fifteen years, this Article is limited to Brady violations discovered since 
2000. 
 162. See, e.g., Biles v. United States, 101 A.3d 1012, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (reversing a 
conviction because the government failed to disclose that the basis of the search of the defendant’s 
backpack was a paid informant even though such information would have been critical to 
suppressing the evidence in the backpack on Fourth Amendment grounds); Vaughn v. United 
States, 93 A.3d 1237, 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (reversing the aggravated assault convictions of two 
inmates after it was revealed that the government withheld a report suggesting that one of the 
witnesses who identified the inmates had fabricated assault charges in the past to justify using 
chemical agents on inmates); Miller v. United States, 14 A.3d 1094, 1097, 1123 (D.C. Cir.  2011) 
(holding the government failed to disclose material exculpatory evidence by not disclosing grand 
jury testimony that eyewitness said that the shooter used his left hand when the defendant was right-
handed); Lindsey v. United States, 911 A.2d 824, 839 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (finding the government 
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Boyd v. United States, 908 A.2d 39, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (finding that when the government failed 
to provide even one potentially exculpatory witness to the material evidence brought against the 
defendant that the governments obligations to the defendant pursuant to Brady were violated); 
Sykes v. United States, 897 A.2d 769, 770 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (reversing when the Court found that 
governments late disclosure of Brady information had a material effect on defendants ability to 
defend himself); Bennett v. United States, 797 A.2d 1251, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that the 
government does have the obligation to disclose material evidence even if it adversely effects the  
creditability of the government’s witness). 
 163. See, e.g., Zanders v. United States, 999 A.2d 149, 161–65 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (criticizing 
the prosecution for the late disclosure of evidence suggesting that another individual might have 
had a motive to shoot and kill the victim in a homicide case, but holding the late disclosure did not 
warrant a new trial because the defense had but failed to take advantage of several opportunities to 
follow up on the report); see also Perez v. United States, 968 A.2d 39, 65–66 (D.C. Cir. 2009) 
(criticizing the prosecution for the late disclosure of grand jury testimony containing statements 
that casted doubt whether an eyewitness actually witnessed the crime with which the defendant 
was charged, but finding no Brady violation because the defense was able to elicit those statements 
on cross-examination). 
 164. See, e.g., Shelton v. United States, 983 A.2d 363, 366–67 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (describing 
how the trial court found a Brady violation when the prosecutor failed to disclose that an eyewitness 
failed to identify the defendant as the shooter in an assault case and agreeing with the trial court’s 
decision to continue rather than dismiss the case), vacated by 26 A.3d 233 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(affirming the defendant’s convictions because it considered there was harmless error in the 
defendant’s case and also questioned whether the defense actually preserved the issue for appeal); 
Odom v. United States, 930 A.2d 157, 159 (D.C. 2007) (affirming the trial’s court denial of 
sanctions for the prosecution’s late disclosure of an eyewitness that alleged an individual other than 
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there have been nine Brady violations found by the District of Columbia Court 
of Appeals in reported decisions from 2000-2015.165  Looking at the D.C. Court 
of Appeals shows that there are not simply two reported cases per year as was 
suggested by the prosecutors over the course in the entire United States.  Instead, 
every other year, in a single jurisdiction, a prosecutor has violated Brady in a 
way that made its way to the Court of Appeals. 
Those published opinions only tell part of the story.  In a letter supporting a 
proposed Brady rule in the District, the Public Defender Service for the District 
of Columbia cited to eight unpublished cases just in 2014–2015 where trial 
courts found Brady violations or prosecutors dismissed or offered misdemeanor 
pleas during the course of Brady litigation.166  That is eight different Brady 
violations in a single courthouse over two years.  With a Washington Post article 
documenting five different cases between 2009-2011 with Brady violations 
where trial judges took action, there are far more Brady violations than are 
captured by published appellate decisions.  With more trials taking place in D.C. 
Superior Court than in federal district courts in the U.S., looking at the District 
is a way to focus a microscope on the Brady problems of the Department of 
Justice.  Looking not just at published opinions, looking carefully at the data-
rich District of Columbia Superior Court shows that Brady violations take place 
several times a year in a single office of the USAO.  Brady violations are not 
rare occurrences at all, but commonplace ones.  So common, those prosecutors 
have systems in place to hide and minimize them with dismissals and generous 
plea offers so that their conduct is not questioned. 
B.  Other United States Attorneys’ Offices 
It is not just that the United States Attorney’s Office in the District of 
Columbia that has withheld Brady material.  The United States Attorney’s Office 
has made all manner of Brady violations since 2000 all over the country.  The 
following are examples of these failures. 
There are Brady failures that come to light in the trial stage that would not be 
captured by appellate reversals.  In 2004 the DOJ asked a federal judge in Detroit 
to vacate terrorism convictions against two men because of Brady violations.167  
In Sacramento, California, the original conviction was vacated for a man 
                                                 
the defendant was responsible for the crimes with which the defendant was charged because the 
defense still had three months to locate and talk with the eyewitness and three other witnesses 
placed the defendant at the scene of the crimes). 
 165. See supra notes 168. 
 166. See generally THE PUBLIC SERVICE DEFENDER, REGARDING RULE 16 OF THE FEDERAL 
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (2010), http://www.pdsdc.org/docs/default-source/default-
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2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/01/us/us-asks-for-dismissal-of-terrorism-
convictions.html. 
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convicted of environmental terrorism where the United States Attorney’s Office 
withheld information about the cooperator.168  A man in Indiana won a new trial 
after an Assistant United States Attorney withheld information that another man 
had admitted owning the firearm that the defendant had been convicted of 
possessing.169  This information was discovered mid-trial.. In 2009 federal 
prosecutors in Florida failed to turn over impeachment information from the 
defense and the attorneys were publicly reprimanded.170  A federal trial judge in 
the Western District of Virginia found that an Assistant United States Attorney 
intentionally suppressed Brady to protect her “principal witness from damaging 
and embarrassing cross-examination”.171  In his opinion, the judge wrote that the 
failure to disclose Brady, “…was not an inadvertent oversight.”172  The trial 
judge granted a new trial and removed the AUSA from the case.173  While the 
full disclosure about the officer came on one week before the appellate brief was 
due, the case was decided by the trial judge who gave the man a re-trial after the 
Fourth Circuit remanded the case.174  Therefore, this serious finding against the 
office would not be an appellate reversal that the United States Attorney would 
count in its Brady statistics. 
In one troubling case that made headlines, the Chief U.S. District Court Judge 
for the District of Massachusetts Wolf asked the Massachusetts Board of Bar 
overseers to look into disciplinary proceedings against a U.S. Attorney for 
withholding evidence from the defense that the main witness in a mafia murder 
case had tried to recant his story to authorities.175  In one instance Judge Wolf 
wrote of federal prosecutors, “[c]ustomary means of addressing errors and 
intentional misconduct had proved inadequate to prevent the repetition of 
violations of constitutional duties. . . .” 176 
These cases are all cases were the Brady violation was uncovered prior to trial 
or in trial so there is not an appellate reversal.  The violation was cured, so these 
are cases would not have made ripples or made it to public opinions but for the 
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judges’ frustration with the government.  But these type of failures show that 
some federal prosecutors are withholding information until the last moment. 
And there is no shortage of appellate reversals on Brady grounds either.  The 
First Circuit found a Brady violation in 2008 by the U.S. Attorney’s Office in 
Puerto Rico for failing to turn over to the defense prior to trial a report that could 
have been used to impeach a government witness.177 
A 2012 decision by the Second Circuit found that the United States Attorney’s 
Office failed to turn over portions of transcripts that undermined the 
government’s main witness.178  That case was tried two times with lawyers from 
the Securities and Exchange Commission and the United States Attorney’s 
Office—neither trial teams turned over the material. The Second Circuit called 
the Brady violation “entirely preventable” and found that prosecutors “on 
multiple occasions either actively decided not to disclose”  the suppressed 
material or “consciously avoided its responsibility to comply with Brady.”179 
The Fourth Circuit documented “a troubling pattern by federal prosecutors of 
withholding evidence from defendants” in North Carolina.180 Assistant United 
States Attorney’s misconduct included “failing to turn over evidence that might 
have been beneficial to a defendant in a firearms case”  and “leaving the false 
testimony of a witness uncorrected.”181 Prosecutors in South Carolina were 
found to have violated Brady by failing to provide impeachment material in its 
possession.182  The Fourth Circuit vacated convictions of two men as a result.183 
The Sixth Circuit reversed convictions where the government failed to 
disclose the exculpatory statements of the co-defendant.184  The court wrote that, 
“nondisclosure of Brady material is still a perennial problem . . . “ and that “once 
again . . . prosecutors substitute their own judgment of the defendants’ guilt for 
that of the jury.” 185  The court of appeals seems exasperated with the prosecutors 
and reflects a recognition that this is not a singular failing by one federal 
prosecutors but a pervasive continuing issue. 
This sentiment towards prosecutors is matched in some Ninth Circuit Brady 
cases.  In 2008, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a trial court’s dismissal of an 
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indictment and found that prosecutors in Nevada violated Brady and Giglio, and 
made misrepresentations in court.186 Six hundred and fifty pages of documents 
related to government witnesses’ prior records were not disclosed. The trial 
judge found that the trial Assistant United States Attorney’s conduct was 
“unconscionable” and that he “made affirmative misrepresentation[s] to the 
court” and “acted flagrantly willfully, and in bad faith.” 187  In upholding the 
dismissal, the Ninth Circuit wrote, we are “troubled, both by the AUSA’s actions 
at trial and by the government’s lack of contrition on appeal.” 188 
It is the ultimate sanction for a trial judge to dismiss a case on Brady 
grounds.189  If a sanction is given for the violation it is often continuance of the 
trial for the defense to catch up and make use of the suppressed information, or 
perhaps an instruction that may make the defense whole.190  But a dismissal 
reflects a fatigue with the usual excuses by the United States Attorney’s Office 
or prejudice that cannot be cured.  The fact that the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
dismissal shows that the Court of Appeals has tired as well. 
But the 2004 dismissal by the trial court and the Ninth Circuit affirmance was 
not a sufficient deterrent.  In 2013, the Ninth Circuit found that U.S. Attorney’s 
Office in Oregon “violated its obligations pursuant to Brady v. Maryland . . . by 
withholding significant impeachment evidence relevant to a central government 
witness.” 191  Prosecutors in Oregon found that the convictions they secured were 
reversed when they failed to learn of exculpatory material about their main 
witness.192  Judge Reinhardt wrote that “at the least the prosecutor failed in his 
duty to learn” of the main witness’s prior convictions.193  This type of disregard 
for due process by trial prosecutors is troubling. 
But the most notable Ninth Circuit case is the one in which Judge Kozinski 
wrote in the dissent, in which three other judges on the Ninth Circuit joined, that 
there was an “epidemic of Brady violations abroad in the land.” 194  Although no 
convictions were reversed because there was “no reasonable probability that the 
verdict would have been different” 195, the Ninth Circuit did find that the 
favorable material was not turned over to the defense.196  In his dissent, Judge 
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Kozinski stated that this panel’s ruling “effectively announces that the 
prosecution need not produce exculpatory or impeaching evidence”  and that it 
is a “signal to prosecutors that, when a case is close, it’s best to hide evidence 
helpful to the defense. . . .” 197  The dissent goes on to say that the prosecutor 
“stood before the district judge and uttered falsehoods” 198 and that “protecting 
the constitutional right of the accused was just not very high on this prosecutors’ 
list of priorities.” 199The “prosecutor just did not take his constitutional duty to 
disclose exculpatory evidence very seriously.”200 The dissent then cites to 
twenty-nine Brady reversals, eight of which are federal prosecutions, as 
evidence that “Brady violations have reached epidemic proportions.”201 
The prosecutors who responded to Judge Kozinski want to focus on how few 
instances of willful Brady violations can be proven in the published opinions—
just two of the eight over fifteen years.  While the DOJ letter opposing the 
proposed rule in the District Court in the District of Columbia say that they 
average two Brady reversals a year. But by focusing only on appellate reversals, 
we miss many other Brady violations.  The cases discussed above where trial 
judges take steps to remedy the violation—like the Stevens case—do not appear 
in those statistics.  The Brady findings that do not meet the reversible error 
standard are not counted in the statistics.202  The dismissals are not captured in 
those two per year statistics.  The continuances that are granted for the defense 
to investigate the late-disclosed Brady are not included in this two per year 
statistic.  The generous plea offers as a result of Brady violations are not counted.  
The still-undisclosed Brady is not factored into the equation.  Prosecutors 
concentrating on willful violations also miss the mark.  The inadvertent Brady 
violations are the ones that could be addressed with the clarity of a rule and other 
easy fixes that the DOJ opposes. 
Certainly it is true that most federal prosecutors try their hardest not to violate 
the dictates of Brady.  While one might argue that a single rogue prosecutor 
could get so convinced of a defendant’s guilt that it might cause him to hide 
exculpatory evidence or that he may want to win at all costs to advance his career 
and keep evidence that weakens his case from the defense, but it is not just 
individual prosecutors who fail to disclose Brady material.203  The failures are 
                                                 
 197. Olsen, 737 F.3d at 630 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting). 
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systemic.  In 2012, the Washington Post reported that the Justice Department 
knew based on a review of its evidence that FBI hair analysis evidence was 
flawed since 2004, but some defendants and their lawyers were not informed 
until years later.204  FBI experts testified in cases all over the country.  In 250 of 
those cases, the DOJ determined that the flawed testimony was “critical” to the 
conviction.205  While the DOJ notified prosecutors, the DOJ did not notify 
defendants or their lawyers themselves.206  And while some prosecutors did 
make immediate disclosures, prosecutors at the United States Attorney’s Office 
did not notify defendants for years.207 
Three men prosecuted by the United States Attorney’s Office were exonerated 
between 2009-2012 after the flawed forensic hair testimony was uncovered.208  
While prosecutors knew in 2004, these men spent additional years in prison 
because of the United States Attorney’s inaction in this case.209  One man, Mr. 
Tribble, spent twenty-eight years in prison after a forensic expert claimed that a 
hair recovered belonged to him, though it was a dog hair.210  A now very 
seriously ill Mr. Tribble won a $13.2 million judgment.211 This is the third multi-
million dollar civil settlement as a result of the flawed testimony.212 
The Project on Government Oversight found more than four hundred 
instances of misconduct by the DOJ from 2002-2013.213  While the numbers 
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came from the Federal Office of Professional Responsibility, names of the 
problem attorneys were not provided.214  Of the misconduct, twenty-nine 
instances were prosecutors failing to turn over exculpatory material.215 
The numbers of Brady violations that we know of by the United States 
Attorney’s Office is substantial.  As mentioned earlier, there are likely many 
others of which the public and defendants will never be aware.  The DOJ and 
the United States Attorney’s Office both clearly have the obligation to do better 
than they have done.  Ethical and Constitutional mandates are clear.  Their 
failures need to be owned by the office, studied and every effort to correct must 
be made.  Regrettably, it seems that the United States Attorney’s Office and the 
DOJ have been more concerned with minimizing their mistakes. 
III.  SESSIONS’ BRADY RECORD 
In 2017, a new era at the Justice Department began with Attorney General Jeff 
Sessions.  Jeff Sessions began his work as a prosecutor in 1975 for the Southern 
District of Alabama and was the head of that office from 1981 to 1993.216  He 
was elected as the Attorney General for the state of Alabama and served between 
1994 and 1996 before he became a United States Senator the following year.217 
Sessions has a controversial record.  In his brief time, just two years, as 
Attorney General of Alabama there were four Brady findings against his 
office.218  Additionally, there were other allegations of Brady violations that the 
defense was unable to prove to the Alabama Court of Appeals and the Eleventh 
Circuit.219  The most noteworthy case Sessions handled is a case in which 
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Sessions, while a U.S. Attorney, prosecuted black civil rights activists 
attempting to help elderly black people vote.220  The three defendants were 
acquitted in just three hours after a weeks-long trial.221  Some questioned the 
motives of the USAO’s use of tremendous resources to prosecute black civil 
rights activists so aggressively.222 
Under Session’s tenure, Alabama’s Office of the Attorney General was found 
to have committed several Brady violations.  In 1995, the Court of Criminal 
Appeals of Alabama in Hamilton v. State ordered a new trial because prosecutors 
in Alabama failed to turn over proof that investigators had promised the principal 
witness in a murder trial help with early release.223 In 1996, Shields v. Alabama, 
the court reversed a defendant’s murder conviction because the government did 
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not inform the defense that the victim had a prior assault conviction even though 
the defendant was arguing self-defense.224 In 1997, the court reversed a 
defendant’s rape conviction because the prosecution intentionally failed to call 
as a witness a police officer on the scene who was told that that the victim denied 
being raped and who would have corroborated another officer’s testimony that 
the victim did not appear scared and was fully dressed and not disheveled.225  
These reversals are all clear violations of Brady’s mandate to disclose 
exculpatory evidence. 
In the most famous Brady violation committed by Sessions, Alabama v. Tieco, 
Inc., an Alabama Circuit Court judge said that Sessions’ actions “‘far surpassed 
in extensiveness and measure in totality any prosecutorial misconduct ever 
presented to or witnessed by th[e] court.’”226  Tieco arose because Sessions 
pursued 222 criminal charges against TIECO, Inc., a competitor of U.S. Steel, 
around the time U.S. Steel donated to Sessions’ senatorial campaign.227  During 
the case, Sessions’ office repeatedly denied the existence of exculpatory 
evidence, repeatedly refused to provide such evidence when requested, and 
allowed many of the prosecution’s witnesses and its own employees to deceive 
the court.228  Ultimately, the judge dismissed all charges because “the 
prosecutorial misconduct [wa]s so pronounced and persistent that it permeate[d] 
the entire atmosphere of this prosecution and warrant[ed] a dismissal of these 
cases.”229 
Sessions’ responded that “[c]harges like ‘prosecutorial misconduct’ offend[ed 
him].”230  Although Sessions neither offered contrition nor offered a defense to 
the conduct of the office he said, “if prosecutors are continued to be abused by 
defense lawyers, it can shill their willingness to take on high-profile, complex 
cases.” 231  Sessions left to go to the Senate shortly after that case.  No appeal of 
the judge’s ruling was taken by the office.232 
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While most prosecutors would be chastened by this type of dressing down by 
a judge, Sessions did not offer contrition or even a defense or explanation.  
Rather, he blamed defense counsel for exposing his office’s constitutional 
violation.  The lack of an appeal after such a public lashing suggests that other 
lawyers in the office thought that they would have little chance on appeal of 
justifying what took place. 
While he was the head of the USAO, Jeff Sessions was nominated in 1986 by 
then-President Ronald Reagan to become a federal district court judge.233  
During his confirmation hearing, it came to light that Sessions used the word 
“nigger.”234  He also made jokes about the Ku Klux Klan to a black lawyer in 
his office.235  Sessions, then thirty-nine at the time of the hearing, conceded to 
make those statements, but insisted he made them in jest.236  As a white man 
who grew up in the segregated deep south in the 1950s and 60s,237 it is not hard 
to believe that he may have harbored negative feelings towards African 
Americans even as a prosecutor.  As a result of these allegations of racism, 
Sessions was not confirmed.238 
Given those racially insensitive comments were made decades ago, they may 
give only limited insight into Sessions’ current views on black people.  On the 
other hand, his being the head of the federal criminal justice system, which has 
been criticized for its racism towards African Americans, is troubling.239  
Someone who does not view black people as equal to whites may not be inclined 
to treat them fairly in the adversarial criminal justice system. 
While on the campaign trail for Trump in 2016, Sessions applauded Trump’s 
1989 full page advertisement in the New York Times calling for the death 
penalty for five African American teenagers accused of raping a jogger in 
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Central Park.240  At the time that Sessions made those comments the five had 
long been exonerated.241  Rape is not a capital offense.242  Nevertheless Sessions 
celebrated Trump for the gesture of the ad and the tough stance against the 
innocent young men.243 This position seems at odds with someone seeking 
criminal justice reform. 
In addition to examining Brady record and statements on race, looking into 
his views on other criminal justice issues may offer some insight into what kind 
of AG Sessions will be.  Within days of assuming office, Sessions saw to it that 
the DOJ’s policy towards a move away from private prisons was reversed.244  
Housing federal criminal prisoners in private contract facilities as come under 
fire over the years because of safety concerns and poor health outcomes for 
people in those facilities.245  Some may see Sessions change back to private 
prisons as a cost-savings measure, but his predecessor at that DOJ, Sally Yates, 
found that private prisons do not save tax payers money.246  This move is one 
that has been seen as illustrating a disregard for criminal defendants.247 
The Sessions DOJ has indicated it would not pursue civil rights actions against 
police departments.248  At a meeting of states attorneys, Sessions indicated that 
the Civil Rights division of DOJ would “pull back” 249 on those remedies that 
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trump-administration-pull-back-police-department-civil-n726826. 
 249. Id. 
2018] Brady and the U.S. Attorney's Office 355 
address police violence against American citizens following the deaths of 
unarmed young men in Ferguson, Mo and Baltimore, Md at the hands of 
police.250  This move is seen by many as a policy change favoring police over 
civilians, particularly ones entangled in the criminal justice system.251  While 
the relationship between private prisons and civil rights policy and Brady policy 
remains to be seen, these position changes certainly suggest that Brady reform 
will not be at the top of the Attorney General’s to-do list. 
Even despite the other items on his agenda given his history as someone who 
has violated Brady without apology, Brady reform is not something Sessions 
will concern himself.. Holder at least talked about training and educating young 
prosecutors, it does not appear that the same will hold true for Sessions.  If we 
are to see Brady reform within the United States Attorney’s Office, it will have 
to come from the bench, Congress, or litigation by defense attorney while 
Sessions is the Attorney General.  It does not appear we will see progress from 
inside the DOJ. 
IV.  DOJ’S FIGHT AGAINST CHANGE 
Even prior to the appointment of Jeff Sessions as Attorney General, the DOJ 
has consistently resisted meaningful Brady reform.  In the 2015 letter responding 
to Judge Kozinski, the prosecutors called themselves “stewards of the public’s 
trust”  and “committed to fair play and honest dealings in every matter [they] 
handle.”252  Nonetheless, the following year, the Lynch DOJ sent a letter 
opposing a proposed rule that would regulate the dissemination of Brady 
material by prosecutors, arguing the rule would “significantly expand the scope 
of the government’s disclosure obligation and accelerate the timing of such 
disclosures” at the cost of negatively impacting DOJ’s ability to protect 
witnesses and increasing the costs of litigation, ultimately to address a rare 
occurrence.253  Again citing the statistic stating that Brady violations are found  
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“on average fewer than two reported federal cases each year . . . ,” 254 the letter 
states that the “Department of Justice strongly urges the Court to reject the 
proposal in its entirety.”255  There appears to be no recognition that two a year 
is a significant number or that there are more than two Brady violations a year.  
The violations missing from the figure just have not made it into a published 
opinion. 
The rule proposed in the District of Columbia would simply require 
prosecutors to follow their ethical obligations, stating that the Brady obligation 
begins at the “defendant’s initial appearance before the court.” 256  Noticeably, 
the rule does not have a materiality standard.257  In many ways that is simpler–
prosecutors need not wrestle with whether information is material or not.  The 
proposed rule is straightforward. 
In anticipation of the concerns that DOJ expressed in its letter, the proposed 
rule contains a provision for witnesses’ safety or national security, or time-
sensitive law enforcement techniques.258  In those instances where there is a law 
enforcement concern or a witness security issue, prosecutors “may apply to the 
court for a modification” of the rule.259  There is nothing extreme or out of the 
ordinary about the new rule that has been proposed.  It is not as broad as the 
Brady rule in federal court in Massachusetts.260  The District Court in the District 
of Columbia would not be alone—over twenty-five District Courts have rules 
regulating what prosecutors must disclose and more than a dozen have standing 
orders.261  The ABA supports the proposed Brady rule.262 
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The DOJ response to this suggested rule was severe.  In a seventeen-page 
single-spaced letter the DOJ laid out its opposition.263. They called the rule – 
proposed by two federal judges (among others) – “unwarranted and unwise.”264 
They claimed that the rule will “upend decades of settled practice.”265 They say 
“the proposed rule eliminates Brady’s ‘materiality’ requirement and seeks to 
provide the defense with what might amount to open file discovery.”266 Though 
later in the letter they state that their own internal regulations requires 
“disclosure by prosecutors of information beyond which is ‘material’ to guilt. . 
. .” 267  Nevertheless, the letter stated that the rule is “unnecessary to ensure a 
constitutionally fair trial.”268  This is an extreme reaction to a rule particularly 
from an agency that is supposed to ensure fair trials.  The fact that the office 
opposes this rule in the wake of the high-profile scandals and in a time when 
much of the criminal justice system is being questioned is also evidence of the 
extent to which the office seeks to avoid change.  With Sessions at the helm, it 
is unlikely that DOJ will reverse course in this regard. 
This is not the first time the United States has opposed a rule regulating Brady.  
The DOJ successfully fought a proposed federal rule several times.  In 2004, 
DOJ opposed an amendment to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16 (“Rule 
16”)—the federal discovery rule—that would include a provision on exculpatory 
material.269 Once again, in 2009, following the fallout from the Steven case, 
prosecutors again opposed the expansion of Rule 16 to include Brady 
material.270  While the DOJ has consistently maintained that a modification of 
Rule 16 is unwarranted, this view is not shared with all the players in the criminal 
justice system, as evidenced by a survey conducted in 2010 that found that ninety 
percent of defense attorneys and fifty percent of federal judges supported a 
change to the rule.271 
The government has even fought access to information about how their office 
decides when to disclose Brady material.  The DOJ fought efforts to obtain 
copies of their discovery practices, memorialized in the “blue book.” 272  One of 
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the reasons not to make the handbook public that the DOJ cited was that sharing 
the information would divulge DOJ’s litigation strategies to the defense and 
thereby “hamper the adversarial process.”273  When the National Association of 
Defense and Legal Aid Lawyers attempted to get access to it, the DOJ 
successfully kept the NACDL from getting access to the handbook.274  
Eventually the newspaper USA Today was able to get copies through a 
lawsuit.275 
V.  SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM 
Although no doubt there are prosecutors who purposefully hide material from 
the defense to make their cases stronger to win convictions, there are also 
prosecutors who simply find themselves in a culture that does not provide them 
with appropriate guidance and support to do their job correctly.276  In addition, 
prosecutors get entrenched in groupthink, tunnel vision, and other unconscious 
biases that encourage prosecutors to try to win at all costs.277  Prosecutors asked 
to imagine themselves as the defense and to determine how information might 
be of use to a defendant will likely fail.  Prosecutors can easily explain away or 
erroneously minimize relevant evidence.  Because of the lack of support for 
Brady reform by the DOJ, real reform will have to come from the bench and 
legislature and/or through litigation and pressure from criminal defense 
attorneys. 
A.  Open File Discovery 
The single easiest fix to the Brady problem would be for actual open file 
discovery. Legal scholars have called for open file discovery over the years.278  
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Open file discovery by its very nature means that generally prosecutors will not 
withhold anything.279  Open files mean also that prosecutors do not have to make 
the call about what is helpful to the defense.  Rather, the defense can decide on 
its own because the defense has access to all the information that the government 
does about the alleged offense. 
Open file discovery is not burdensome given that most evidence exists in an 
electronic format.280  The state of Texas has implemented open file discovery, 
albeit a somewhat limited form.281  Their open file law was put in place in 
response after it was revealed that prosecutors withheld exculpatory information 
that caused an innocent man to serve twenty-five years for a murder he did not 
commit after DNA exonerated him.282 Open file discovery law was created to 
take the decision to turn over exculpatory evidence out of the hands of 
prosecutors and thereby reduce wrongful convictions.283 
To the extent that open file raises concerns about witness security, appropriate 
redactions or protective orders that limit with whom the information can be 
shared can address those concerns.  In certain instances when the protection of 
a witness is an issue, the defense attorneys may not be given the witness’s name 
or information may not be shared outside of the defense team.  This exception 
would alleviate any concerns about witness security. 
The opposition to open file discovery seems to be largely to gain a tactical 
advantage over the defense.  With protective orders and redactions, there is no 
other disadvantage to the government.  An office that claims to “seek justice”284 
should crave an even playing field between the prosecutor and defense 
particularly after the high-profile lapses.  However, the USAO and DOJ have 
opposed open file rules for decades in many jurisdictions.285  With little chance 
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for support for open file by the government, open file may be an untenable goal 
without support from Congress. 
B.  Rules 
While prosecutors continue to limit the defense access to information, court 
rules that guides their conduct is the next best thing.  Although a national federal 
rule has been suggested in the past,286 it is certainly time for one now.  With 
stark evidence that withheld Brady material is a major cause of reversals in 
criminal cases,287 as well as a leading cause of wrongful convictions,288 it is hard 
to justify not implementing a rule.  Such rule would help trial courts ensure the 
fairness of their proceedings and court rules help achieve that goal and trial court 
simply should not allow the government to burden our appellate courts. Fewer 
innocent people in jail and fewer reversals in criminal convictions cannot be 
something that prosecutors can legitimately oppose.  Rules that regulate timing 
and dispense with decisions about materiality by prosecutors should make 
obligations much clearer to prosecutors.  Rules that guide young and 
inexperienced prosecutor should be welcomed by all.  Defense attorneys can 
also more adequately advise clients if they know when to expect disclosure of 
Brady information. 
But given that a national rule has been suggested and failed, local federal rules 
are the next best thing in the interim.  The United States Courts for the District 
of Massachusetts has a rule289 that was also opposed by the DOJ.290  It followed 
the 2009 mid-trial disclosure of Brady in federal court. Yet despite the 
opposition by the USAO and the DOJ, the rule still was passed.291 
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C.  Orders 
Judges who find themselves in jurisdictions without rules that regulate Brady 
material should order prosecutors to turn over exculpatory material before trial.  
After the Senator Stevens debacle, Judge Sullivan called on his “judicial 
colleagues on every trial court everywhere . . . to consider entering an 
exculpatory evidence order at the outset of every criminal case.” 292  Like a rule, 
orders given in all criminal cases would set up expectations for the defense and 
guides the conduct of the prosecutor.293 In addition, the judge could decide what 
stage at which he enters the order, at the beginning of the case or at indictment 
in order to balance the interests of both sides. 
Such order is likely to yield different results than a young prosecutor simply 
having a general notion from criminal procedure class that information that is 
material to innocence should be turned over.  The natural extension of orders in 
specific cases is that when prosecutors willfully violate order, that they be held 
in contempt.  This penalty provides an additional deterrent for prosecutors to 
commit Brady violations. 
D.  Punitive Jury Instructions 
Judges should also consider punitive jury instructions in cases in which 
prosecutors withhold Brady material.294  This type of instruction would inform 
jurors of 1) the government’s Brady obligation, 2) the plain facts of the non-
compliances, and 3) allow jurors to infer that the government’s withholding of 
information means that the government believes that its case is weak. 
The federal judge in United States v. W.R. Grace gave an instruction with the 
first two components.295  The District of Columbia Court of Appeals sanctioned 
such a practice and then after a petition for rehearing en banc, withdrew its 
opinion.296  Additionally, legal scholars have called for such a remedy as a 
sanction for intentional Brady violations.297  Punitive jury instructions are a 
significant sanction but it is a less severe one than dismissal, which a number of 
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jurisdictions have come to allow.298  Either sanction is likely to make prosecutors 
think twice about failing to turn over evidence. 
E.  Referrals to Bar Counsel 
Prosecutors suffer little to no consequences for their actions when they 
withhold Brady.  Few are prosecuted criminally despite violating laws.299  
Prosecutors do not seem to lose their jobs when they withhold Brady.300  They 
rarely seem to suffer any sanction, even professionally.301  Even the prosecutors 
in the Senator Stevens case—one of the most reported Brady violations in recent 
years—were shuffled around to different parts of the DOJ rather than 
dismissed.302  Because prosecutors do not suffer professional consequences in 
their own office when they violate the constitution, judges should make sure that 
they do. 
Prosecutors risk little personally when they withhold information and yet 
stand to benefit professionally if they win a case, so a powerful incentive is at 
play when they have information that is favorable to the defense, but about 
which that the defense does not know.  Legal commentators have observed that 
if prosecutors were sanctioned more frequently, the instances of Brady 
violations would decrease.303  More frequent sanctions would keep bad 
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prosecutors from reoffending.  Professional sanctions are a warning to other 
prosecutors not emulate this practice. 
However, judges rarely refer prosecutors to bar counsel for professional ethics 
sanctions.304  They should.  It is a clear violation of a prosecutor’s ethical 
obligation to withhold favorable information from the defense.  However, 
referrals of federal prosecutors to bar counsel are rare and even more rare than 
state prosecutors.305  If they risked the prospect of losing their bar license and 
livelihood for withholding Brady material, it stands to reason that prosecutors 
would be less likely to commit Brady violations. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The DOJ has consistently rejected Brady reform for decades.  It is unlikely 
that the prospects will be any better with Jeff Sessions as Attorney General.  
Sessions’ own record of unapologetic Brady violations and his stance on other 
criminal justice issues make it clear that improvements that benefit criminal 
defendants are not priorities for him. 
The ideas for reform proposed above should be considered by legislators and 
judges.  Open file discovery would be the best way to curtail Brady violations.  
All but the most conscious, intentional, egregious violations would be avoided 
by allowing the defense access to the government’s files. 
In the absence of open file discovery, the suggested rules and orders should 
give guidance to young prosecutors who are not clear on their obligations.  A 
change in personnel, at least among the discovery coordinators within the DOJ, 
would help prosecutors with the close calls on materiality. 
In addition to guidance, deterrence is needed.  Punitive jury instructions would 
serve as a deterrent to the withholding of information.  Knowing that one might 
get a sanction mid-trial in the form of an instruction telling jurors that you have 
1) violated the constitution and 2) you did it because your case was weak might 
cause a prosecutor to turn over material long before the trial starts.  Referrals to 
bar counsel by judges when they find Brady violations would also be a powerful 
deterrent.  Prosecutors would likely not risk losing their livelihoods by violating 
Brady. 
The DOJ cannot continue to fight reform and yet maintain its prestige.  The 
reputation of the USAO suffered mightily because of the number of recent 
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scandals–in The District of Columbia, Massachusetts, Montana, Nevada, 
California, Oregon.  The failures of the DOJ have taken their toll on the 
reputation of the Department in the legal community and in the public in general.  
Federal trial judges and appellate judges have taken the office to task in very 
public ways.  Judges Kozinski, Sullivan, and Wolf have all publicly called for 
the offices to institute reform.  Continuing to fight progress cannot be said to be 
in pursuit of fairness or justice.  It is time for the DOJ to implement real change 
and stop fighting efforts at reform.  Ethics, justice, and fair play demand that the 
USAO and the DOJ do better. 
 
